3 
mg of this society, when a slight change of its 
title was under consideration, the late Mr. Warry 
strongly urged that it should be called a literary 
and philosophical society. This suggestion was 
not adopted, but whether for the reason that 
the literary ground was already occupied I am 
unable to say. Of course I do not affect to bind 
the society by such utterances, but for myself I 
would remark that, for the present, the wider 
our scope of subjects the better, and that we 
should not be over anxious to draw subtle 
lines of demarcation between art, litera- 
ture, science, and philosophy, if indeed 
any line can be drawn between the 
last two. Diverse as are our mental pursuits 
and tastes, this society is fortunately untainted 
by any cliquish spirit. Eeligious questions we 
avoid, and the profession of a religious creed is 
as little a condition of, as it is a disqualification 
for, admission here. It is possible that this at- 
titude in reference to religion may cause many 
to look coldly or unfavorably on us and our 
objects. Some estimable persons may think that 
our neutrality is objectionable, and others may 
even entertain the notion that science and 
philosophy are in general antagonistic to re- 
ligion. But surely mere neutrality ought not 
to be allowed to operate to our prejudice. 
There are questions, deeply interesting to such 
persons, on which it is not alone the tongue of 
scientific bodies that is silent. If such neu- 
trality be a ground for regarding us with dis- 
favor, the like disfavor should extend to banks 
and other mercantile corporations or to railway 
companies, bodies from which no man yet, that 
I know of, has held himself aloof on the ground 
of their theological impassiveness. But, it may 
be objected, science ignores the possibility 
of those supernatural interruptions of the 
course of nature, of those miracles and pro- 
phecies which so many regard as the befitting 
attestation and evidence of a divine revelation, 
The physicist may retort “ You also ignore them. 
In the conduct of your affairs are you in- 
fluenced by the expectation of any such 
occurrences P ” Probably most such ob- 
jectors would reply in this fashion, “ I am a 
firm believer in miracles, but the miracles 
in which, I believe, were wrought for an ade- 
quate end. I do not think that the course of 
nature is interfered with indiscriminately or 
even frequently.” Then how far do the dis- 
putants disagree ? The physicist is no more to 
be blamed than the objector, when he takes for 
granted the existence of permanent natural 
laws without which science — that is to say, sys- 
tematic knowledge, would be unattainable. 
Still, I am not sure that such objectors as I 
have alluded to are fully answered. And, 
although in the skirmishes between religion and 
science religion has been sometimes the ag- 
gressor, I feel bound to say that in the present 
case the aggression has commenced on the 
part of those who range themselves on 
the scientific side. The phrase “ laws of 
nature ” is sufficiently expressive, and, 
if we remember that the word law is 
used metaphorically, sufficiently accurate. But 
some persons prefix “ immutable,” and speak of 
the immutable laws of nature. Wow, it is one 
thing to prefix an adjective, and another to 
add to our knowledge, and the former is the 
easier task. If by saying that the laws of nature 
are immutable nothing more is meant than tha t, 
within our individual experience, and that of 
all credible persons with whom we are ac- 
quainted, confirmed by the experience and 
events of the present and past ages, so far as 
they can be ascertained, those laws have been 
unchanged, then the prefix “ immutable ,J does 
not add to our stock of knowledge. The idea of 
permanence is associated with the phrase laws of 
nature, if not actually implied in it. Again, if 
it is intended to be said that no means of 
changing them is known to man, and that no 
human agency has ever changed or interrupted 
their course, the expression is unobjectionable, 
except perhaps for its ambiguity. But if, in 
terming the laws of nature immutable, it is 
meant to be asserted, either that those laws are 
unchangeable by any agency whatever, or that, 
apart from any agency, the laws of nature 
must of necessity, and throughout an un- 
limited future, remain the same as they 
now are, physical science, as I understand 
it, gives no warrant for the assertion. 
That such an assertion might wound religious 
susceptibilities would not be a reason for re- 
jecting it, if it rested on sufficient grounds. 
And I animadvert upon it, not as assuming to 
interfere in the disputations of theological or 
other sages or sciolists, or as seeking to with- 
draw one of their many bones of contention, 
but as attempting to remove a misconception, 
which may exist in some minds, as to us and 
our objects. We ought not to be subjected, 
even to baseless prejudice, for doctrines which 
the society, as a body, certainly does not hold, 
and which perhaps none of its members 
hold. The conviction of the existence of laws 
of nature does nob rest upon grounds of 
consciousness, or intellectual intuition, or pure 
thought, but upon that instinctive belief in the 
permanence of sequences which is common to 
man and brute. The furtive dog appears to 
recognise theft and lash as members of a per- 
manent sequence, and refrains from the ante- 
cedent through dread of the consequent. He 
shapes his conduct by his observation, and may 
even be led to seek new fields of less painful 
experience. His mental organisation is the seat 
of an instinctive belief in sequences, which, 
though it may sometimes mislead him, is his 
only clue in the mazes of experience. But it is 
in man, of course, that we find the best illustra- 
tions of the direction and misdirection of this 
instinctive belief. One curious instance of its 
misdirection has come under my own personal 
notice. A young child, awakening after day- 
break, prematurely disturbed the parental re- 
