5 
which last it may indefinitely approach. Next, 
for the illustration. Suppose that somewhere 
behind and near an opaque vertical screen, 
many times larger than the target, a vertical 
target is placed. The target may be any how 
placed, provided that no portion of it project 
beyond the edge or edges of the screen, the ob- 
ject of the arrangement being that the marks- 
man may be in entire ignorance of the 
position of the target. Now, assuming that 
the marksman is sufficiently skilful to 
hit the screen, and the velocity of the ball suf- 
ficiently great to enable it to pierce both screen 
and target, what is the chance of the centre of 
gravity of the ball passing through the centre 
of gravity of the target ? I select the centre of 
gravity in order to define the points, and not on 
account of any physical or other property of 
that centre. The answer is, that the chance is 
infinitesimally small, smaller than any assign- 
able fraction however small ; that the proba- 
bility of throwing aces a million times con- 
secutively, with unloaded dice, is an enor- 
mously large probability compared with the 
chance in question ; that, were our senses and 
instruments capable of determining whether the 
conditions were fulfilled, a gambler, however 
wealthy, might safely offer any odds whatever 
against the event, and be morally certain of 
winning. Then it may be said, why distinguish 
between such an enormous probability, such a 
moral certainty of winning, and a mathematical 
certainty of winning. The answer is that, do 
what we will, we cannot get rid of the bare 
possibility, infinitesimally small though it be, of 
the event happening. So it is with the laws of 
nature, so it is with every result of experience. 
Behind their moral certainty, behind what may 
seem to some their mathematical certainty, 
there lurks, visible enough to those conversant 
with the theory of probability, a bare 
possibility, the analogue of that just 
pointed out, which forbids him to attribute 
to any such law, or any such result, either im- 
mutability, necessity, or eternity. But, it may 
be said, if you make the permanence of the laws 
of nature rest upon mere belief man has no more 
assurance of that permanence than the hypo- 
thetical dog whom you have imported into the 
discussion. Perhaps not j but man has mathe- 
matical and logical faculties, and, borrowing 
from experience the three laws of motion, and 
from observation the data requisite for their 
application, he can so apply them as 
to extort from planet, and satellite, and 
comet the secret of its movements. The 
canine sharer of the belief has not, 
or does not manifest more than a rudi- 
mentary development of such faculties, and 
does not appear to concern himself with such 
questions as — Whence arise these instinctive 
beliefs ? Why is the course of nature con- 
formable with them ? What is the connection 
between the belief and the law ? Is there any 
connection between the members of a natural 
sequence, beyond that of permanent antecedent 
and consequent in time? If there is, what is 
the connection ? Is it material or not ? These, 
and perhaps other questions, the human inquirer 
puts to consciousness. But consciousness has 
not, that I am aware of, given as yet any 
answer entirely satisfactory to all inquirers. 
And perhaps it is not to consciousness 
or to science that we must look for 
an answer to such questions. Some philoso- 
phers, not content with having reasonably as- 
certained that every known change has an ante- 
cedent, and then, by a process of induction, 
proceeding to the general proposition that every 
change has an antecedent, take a more ambitious 
flight. They contend that the true proposition is, 
not that every change has an antecedent, but that 
every change must have a cause — that is to say, 
cannot but have a cause. They thus 
impress, or seek to impress, a cha- 
racter of necessity upon the relation 
of immediate and unvarying antecedence. 
There is no ground, satisfactory to me at 
all events, for giving to the proposition 
this character of necessity. If the proposition 
rests upon instinctive belief, then for reasons 
already given, I think it is, not only superfluous, 
but absolutely incorrect, to give it such a cha- 
racter. And in order to steer clear of theories 
of causation, of causal judgments, and the like, 
I have used the phrase permanent sequence 
(meaning thereby immediate and unvarying 
antecedence and consequence) instead of cause 
and effect. But, whatever be the views of the 
members of the society on theories of causation, 
they will, I hope, pardon me for attempting to 
detach or explain away an epithet which has 
sometimes been, in my opinion unfortunately, 
applied to the laws of nature — that of “ immu- 
table.” 
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