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cells and vectors as required by the biological containment provisions of the 
NIH Guidelines would suggest less stringent rules than are currently practiced 
in non- recombinant DNA microbiological research in which personnel are exposed 
to more potent and viable bacteria, viruses and other pathogenic organisms. We, 
nevertheless, support the safety provisions of the Guidelines as embodied in the 
biological and physical containment provisions including the section on laboratory 
practices and are committed to voluntary compliance with them. Dr. Skalka is 
prepared to respond to your questions concerning assessment of systems cur- 
rently permitted under the Guidelines and their relationship to the protection and 
safety of laboratory personnel and the general public. 
Some concern has been expressed about the increased risk to which labora--> 
tory and production personnel might be exposed in the scale-up of operations 
from laboratory to pilot plant to full industrial production. Dr. Irving Johnson, 
of Eli Lilly and Company, a firm with vast experience in fermentation technology 
upon which future industrial production of recombinant DNA materials will be 
based, will comment later on the industrial safety features of large-scale fermen- 
tation and associated process engineering. By way of preface to his comments, 
I merely wish to refer the Subcommittee to the general consensus as expressed 
at the recent meeting of the RAC and elsewhere that the relative risk of acci- 
dents in this field is probably greater in a research laboratory than would be the 
case in an industrial operation due to the nature of the equipment, and to the 
number of laboratories and research personnel involved. To the best of my 
knowledge and experience, the safety record of the industry in the production of 
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