Page 18 of Attachment E 
the relevant enfeebling phenotypes, especially when used in con- 
junction with physical containment equipment and facilities, the ef- 
ficacy of which can be independently verified. 
Question 6: 
“Explore the potential impact of recombinant organisms on non- 
human species (e.g. animals, plants), the atmosphere and oceans. ” 
Comments 
Only a few of the 25 answers received have a direct bearing on this 
question. Some touch it marginally as described below: 
(i) Dr. M.H. Richmond, of UK/GMAG (Document No. 12), in- 
dicates that although no work can be specifically identified 
as targeted to this point, a subcommittee is looking into the 
possible hazards to plants. 
At present, advice is being given that (a) plants used as hosts 
for novel recombinant DNA should require special con- 
tainment in suitable greenhouses; (b) the most likely 
significant hazards would arise from handling fungi with 
aerial spores; conventional containment would be inap- 
propriate. 
(ii) Dr. E.G. Bollard, from New Zealand GMAG (Document No. 8) 
stresses the specific interest of his country in ex- 
perimentation with plants. Reportedly, attempts have been 
made to introduce N2 fixation genes into mycorrhizal fungi. 
The New Zealand guidelines (which are based on the U.K. 
William’s Report) emphasize the need for containment 
measures with experiments involving plants, and their 
requirement to be commensurate with current plant 
quarantine practice. 
Protoplast fusion when done with cells from flowering plants 
belonging to different families, requires the category I (UK) 
containment level. Fusion with micro-organisms, including 
algae, may need at least category II containments. 
. (iii) The WHO Special Program on Safety Measures in 
Microbiology (Document No. 23) is considering the potential 
impact of “recombinant'’ organisms on targets other than 
man. The report of WHO/NIH consultations on Facilitation 
and Safety in the International Transfer of Research Material 
is aimed at preventing health as well as ecological offenses 
by any potentially infectious organisms. The same applies to 
the broader objective of WHO action toward the elaboration 
of safety measures in microbiology. 
(iv) Dr. D. Stetten of NIH (Document No. 13) relates his answer to 
the broader goal of risk assessment efforts. As bearing on 
this point, he cites the “polyoma" experiment as well as the 
other experiments (shotgunning of variety of eukaryotic 
DNAs in E. coll K-12 followed by infection of normal and 
germ-free mice), directed at testing possible changes in 
pathogenicity of E. coli K-12. 
- 12 - 
[ 397 ] 
