FEBRUARY 15-16 - MINUTES OF MEETING 
19 
XII. REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF x 1776(MUA-3) . 
The RAC reviewed a proposal from Dr. Robert Schimke of Stanford University 
for certification of x!776(MUA-3) as an EK2 host-vector system. The RAC 
noted that the proposal is flawed because xl776 is not sensitive to X phage. 
It was agreed that this information would be transmitted to Dr. Shimke. 
XIII. OOOTAINMENT LEVELS FOR SHOTGUN CLONING OF PRIMATE AND OTHER 
MAMMALIAN ENA IN E. COLI K-12 . 
The RAC considered proposed changes in the Sections III-A-l-a-( 1 ) and 
-(2) of the Guidelines so as to include the possibility of P3 + EK1 con- 
tainment as an alternative to the present P2 + EK2 containment requirement 
for the shotgun cloning of primate or other mammalian DNA into E. coli 
K-12. During the 30-day period for public response, no comments were 
received. 
This proposal had been considered during the revision of the Guidelines 
and the issue is discussed in the Decision Document which accompanied 
the Revised Guidelines ( Federal Register , December 22, 1978, page 60088). 
The RAC considered the possibility of requiring an EK2 certified vector 
in EK1 hosts or even a "nonmobilizable vector" as had been proposed at 
the last RAC meeting. Two members emphasized that there should be no 
greater containment required for general cloning of primate or mammalian 
DNA than is already required for tumor viruses and P3 + EK1 is allowed 
as an alternative to P2 + EK2 in this section of the Guidelines. Dr. 
Kutter felt that this now represents an inconsistency. 
Dr. Young described the physical containment provided by a P3 facility 
which under normal medical microbiological laboratory conditions is used 
only for serious pathogens. He pointed out that physical containment 
is a historic method for containing microbes, whereas biological con- 
tainment was proposed at the Asilomar conference and was viewed as a 
backup to physical containment. Dr. Rcwe stated that EK1 provides an 
immense level of biological containment. It was noted that P3 + HV1 
would be allowed, through equivalency, to be substituted for P2 + HV2 
for B. subtilis , N. crassa , and S. cerevisiae host-vector systems. The 
question was raised whether the arguments for the containment of EK1 
systems also hold for these other systems. Dr. Baltimore stated that 
while we have less experience with the new HV systems they are naturally 
contained systems. Dr. Kutter pointed out that the P3 level requires a 
biological safety officer, an added element of protection at the local 
level . 
[ 65 ] 
