May 21-23 - MINUTES OF MEETING 
15 
PI containment should be handled entirely by local IBCs which would 
maintain records. Dr. Young pointed out that regulations are costly. 
Dr. Zaitlin said that he favors the proposal that endorses the requirements 
for Pi containment and registration at the local level. 
Dr. Goldstein said that he could not support the Rowe-Campbell proposal. 
He said that more information is needed. Dr. Redford stated that he has 
doubts about the proposal, and is not convinced that there have been 
enough risk-assessment studies to support the proposed action. Dr. Walters 
stated that one of the strongest arguments for the proposed exemption is 
that the RAC has to be quite selective about its attention to risks. 
With the exemption, the RAC could concentrate its attention on other 
areas of more concern. He said that this is also true of IBCs. He said 
that other approaches could be explored, such as a simple notification 
scheme at the local level, or simplified IBC review procedures. Dr. Krimsky 
questioned what information has become available since issuance of the 
revised Guidelines to support the proposal. He said that the new data 
are not sufficient. He said that the discovery of intervening sequences 
was unexpected, and that additional unexpected facts may emerge. 
Dr. Novick preposed that further studies be done on the frequency of 
natural exchange, and that the RAC work on a formula for deregulation 
that does not involve total exemption from the Guidelines. Dr. Campbell 
said that the wcrld is saturated with _E. coli and lambda, and that 
laboratory constructs without a selective advantage would not be able to 
compete in nature. He said that when there are concerns they should be 
handled by other mechanisms that prevail in medical microbiology. 
Dr. Williams, noring an array of opinions, moved the following: 
"That the chair appoint a working group 
to: (a) conduct a rigorous scientific 
analysis of the E. coli K-12 host-vector 
systems with specific regard to the 
state of evidence of attendant biohazards 
of such studies/systems; (b) explore 
existing nonRAC (medical microbiology) 
mechanisms for regulating these specific 
host-vector systems; (c) develop proposals 
for 'new' devices for ensuring laboratory 
safety standards with such systems; and 
(d) report the results of this working 
group to the full RAC for its consideration." 
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