SECOND REPORT OF THE COGENE WORKING GROUP ON RISK ASSESSMENT 
3 
(Bristol) and Dr. E. S. Anderson (London) who had been conducting routine moni- 
toring of their personnel involved in bacterial and plasmid research. These 
three scientists agreed to collate the results of their surveys for COGENE. 
Their conclusions, which were summarized by Dr. M. Richmond during this meeting, 
are included as Appendix II of this report. In our view these findings are of 
special importance because they record experience from real working situations 
in which no more than accepted microbiological practice has been employed. The 
results showed that under these conditions no acquisition of bacteria or even 
transraissable plasmids could be detected. 
Additional data which bear on the assessment of risks has become available since 
our first report. These include results from the "polyoma" experiments now 
documented in the literature (Israel, M. t^t. al^ (1979); Chan, H. W. ejt. al 
(1979) and in preceeding contributions in this volume. These studies, meant to 
be "worst case" tests using an extremely sensitive assay, show that polyoma- 
containing recombinant hybrids or hybrid-containing bacteria are either non- 
inf ectious or are less infectious in mouse than the virus itself. Thus, they 
constitute strong support for the conclusions from the Ascot Animal Virus Work- 
shop mentioned above. 
Finally, as mentioned above, specifically targeted projects designed to provide 
information on the survival potential of recombinants or recombinant-containing 
E. coli in aerosols, sewage, and the intestines of mouse and man have been the 
subject of several contracts supported by the U.S. NIH. Although these studies 
are still not complete, progress reviewed at a March 19, 1979 meeting at NIH 
also tends to confirm original estimates on the relative enfeeblement of those 
systems. Appendix I of this report is a summary of that meeting prepared by Dr. 
J. Setlow, Chairman of the NIH Recombinant Advisory Committee, who presided. 
How do these findings effect the future goals of our Working Group and what 
advice can COGENE offer its' sponsoring scientific unions and national organi- 
zations at this time? We conclude, as in our first report that no special risk 
inherent to recombinant DNA research has been defined. In the one case most 
thoroughly studied, polyoma virus, the recombinants clearly present less risk 
than the virus itself. With respect to experiments involving El. coli K-12 
systems, it appears that little if any grounds for concern remain. Regardless 
of the nature of the cloned fragment or even its ability to be expressed, 
accepted microbiological practice should be sufficient to prevent escape and 
survival. These conclusions are especially reassuring because they serve to 
restore confidence in the ability to predict the outcome of recombinant DNA 
activities based on available knowledge of the biology of the organisms involved. 
Similar facts relating to other potential cloning systems should prove equally 
predictive and fewer verification experiments should be required. 
However, despite our confidence in the relative safety of recombinant DNA 
techniques as they are currently used in basic research, our Working Group does 
not consider it justified to extrapolate from experience with I£. coli to all 
possible experiments in the future. As technology related to genetic experi- 
mentation evolves, there are sure to be operations and applications that we can 
not even envision at this time. Thus, it is important that a Committee of. 
scientists international in scope, continue to follow developments which relate 
to genetic experimentation, that it continue to collect information to be made 
broadly available and that it stand ready to sponsor specific projects which 
may be necessary for further evaluation. 
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