Attachment III - Page 2 
engineered^ are extremely unlikely to lead to serious prc±>lems. In 
nost organisms, the barriers to expression of foreign genes, the neces- 
sity for new enzyme activities to function as an integrated part of 
an existing pathway, and the selective disadvantage of carrying recom- 
binant DNA, will interfere with such organisms establishing themselves 
in the envircwment and thus ultimately with their potential to cause 
harm. Therefore, for these experiments, the minimal controls associated 
with good laboratory practice should be sufficient. Many such experi- 
ments have already been exenpted ty the NIH from any special procedures. 
2) A particular subset of experiments may pose some possibility of risk. 
In these experiments, the expression of foreign functions may have been 
deliberately increased, or normal functions will have been engineered 
to operate more efficiently. While there is no evidence that this risk 
is qualitatively different from the risks associated with other kinds 
of genetic research, the end result may be an increase in virulence, 
host range, or survivability of some pathogens. 
Given these conclusions, the majority of those present at the July 9 meeting 
supported a proposal vrtiich adepts the containment provisions of the Baltimore- 
Canpbell proposal, but retains the mandatory aspect of the guidelines. A 
minority preferred either a "voluntary code of practice" as stipulated in 
the original Baltimore-Cairpbell proposal, or an end to all specifications 
for working with recombinant ENA, apart from those stipulations of "good 
laboratory practice." 
[ 232 ] 
