Federal Register / Vol. 46, No. 233 / Friday, December 4, 1981 / Notices 
59417 
requirement for prior NIH approval of 
any or all recombinant DMA projects at 
the Institution. 
IV-G-2. All non-NIH funded projects 
involving recombinant DNA techniques 
conducted at or sponsored by an 
Institution that receives NIH funds for 
projects involving such techniques must 
comply with the NIH Guidelines. 
Noncompliance may result in (i) 
suspension, limitation, or termination of 
NIH funds for recombinant DNA 
research at the Institution, or (ii) a 
requirement for prior NIH approval of 
any or all recombinant DNA projects at 
the Institution. 
IV-G-3. Information concerning 
noncompliance with the Guidelines may 
be brought forward by any person. It 
should be delivered to both NIH 
(ORDA) and the relevant Institution. 
The Institution, generally through the 
IBC, shall take appropriate action. The 
Institution shall forward a complete 
report of the incident to ORDA, 
recommending any further action 
indicated. 
IV-G-4. In cases where NIH proposes 
to suspend, limit, or terminate financial 
assistance because of noncompliance 
with the Guidelines, applicable DHEW 
and Public Health Service procedures 
shall govern. 
IV-O-5. Voluntary Compliance. Any 
individual, corporation, or institution 
that is not otherwise covered by the 
Guidelines is encouraged to conduct 
recombinant DNA research activities in 
accordance with the Guidelines, through 
the procedures set forth in Part VI. 
V. Footnotes and References 
(7) The reference to organisms as Class 1, 
2, 3, 4. or 5 refers to the classification in the 
publication Classification of Etiologic Agents 
on the Basis of Hazard, 4th Edition, July 1974; 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, Public Health Service, Centers for 
Disease Control, Office of Biosafety, Atlanta, 
Georgia 30333. The list of organisms in each 
class, as given in this publication, is reprinted 
in Appendix B to these Guidelines. 
The Director, NIH, with advice of the 
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, may 
designate certain of the agents which are 
listed as Class 2 in the Classification of 
Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, 4th 
Edition, July 1974, as Class 1 agents for the 
Purposes of these Guidelines (see Section IV- 
E-l-b-(2Hd)). An updated list of such agents 
may be obtained from the Office of 
Recombinant DNA Activities (ORDA), 
National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, 
Maryland 20205. 
The entire Classification of Etiologic 
Agents on the Basis of Hazard is in the 
process of revision. 
[2] For experiments using Vesicular 
Stomatitis virus (VSV), contact the NIH 
Office of Recombinant DNA Activities. 
[2A) In Parts 1 and III of the Guidelines, 
there are a number of places where 
judgments are to be made. These include: 
"cells known to be infected with such agents" 
(Section I-D-1); "known to acquire it 
naturally" (Section l-D-5); "known to 
produce a potent polypeptide toxin * * * or 
known to carry such pathogens * * * not 
likely to be a product of closely linked 
eukaryote genes * ‘ * shown not to contain 
such agents" (Section III-A-l-a-(5)-(a)): 
"shown to be free of disease causing 
microorganisms" (Section III-A-l-a(5)-(b)): 
"close relatives" (Section III-C-3): and 
"produce a potent polypeptide toxin" 
(Footnote 34). 
In all these cases the principal investigator 
is to make the initial judgment on these 
matters as part of his responsibility to "make 
the initial determination of the required 
levels of physical and biological containment 
in accordance with the Guidelines” (Section 
IV-D-7-a). In all these cases, this judgment is 
to be reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Biosafety Committee as part of 
its responsibility to make "an independent 
assessment of the containment levels 
required by these Guidelines for the proposed 
research” (Section IV-D-3-a-(l)). If the IBC 
wishes, any specific cases may be referred to 
the NIH Office of Recombinant DNA 
Activities as part of ORDA's functions to 
"provide advice to all within and outside 
NIH" (Section IV-E-3), and ORDA may 
request advice from the Recombinant DNA 
Advisory Committee as part of the RAC's 
responsibility for “interpreting and 
determining containment levels upon request 
by ORDA" (Section IV-E-l-b-(2)-(a)). 
(5) The following types of data should be 
considered in determining whether DNA 
recombinants are “characterized” and the 
absence of harmful sequences has been 
established; (a) The absence of potentially 
harmful genes (e.g., sequences contained in 
indigenous tumor viruses or sequences that 
code for toxins, invasins, virulence factors, 
etc., that might potentiate the pathogenicity 
or communicability of the vector and/or the 
host or be detrimental to humans, animals, or 
plants); (b) the type(s) of genetic information 
on the cloned segment and the nature of 
transcriptional and translation gene products 
specified; (c) the relationship between the 
recovered and desired segment (e.g., 
hybridization and restriction endonuclease 
fragmentation analysis where applicable); (d) 
the genetic stability of the cloned fragment; 
and (e) any alterations in the biological 
properties of the vector and host. 
[4) In Section I-E, “exemptions" from the 
Guidelines are discussed. Such experiments 
are not covered by the Guidelines and need 
not be registered with NIH. In Section I-D on 
“prohibitions," the possibility of “exceptions” 
is discussed. An “exception” means that an 
fxperiment may be expressly released from a 
prohibition. At that time it will be assigned 
an appropriate level of physical and 
biological containment. 
(.7) Care should be taken to inactivate 
recombinant DNA before disposal. 
Procedures for inactivating DNA can be 
found in the “Laboratory Safety Monograph: 
A Supplement to the NIH Guidelines for 
Recombinant DNA Research.” 
(6) Laboratory Safety at the Center for 
Disea-ce Control (Sept. 1974). U.S. Department 
of Health Education and Welfare Publication 
No. GDC 75-8118. 
(7) Classification of Etiologic Agents on the 
Basis of Hazard. (4th Edition, July 1974). U.S. 
Department of Health, F.ducation and 
Welfare. Public Health Service. Centers for 
Disease Control. Office of Biosafety. Atlanta. 
Georgia 30333. 
[8) National Cancer Institute Safety 
Standards for Research Involving Oncogenic 
Viruses (Oct. 1974). U.S. Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare Publication 
No. (NIH) 75-790. 
(9) National Institutes of Health 
Biohazards Safety Guide (1974). U.S. 
Department of Health. Education, and 
W'elfare, Public Health. 
[10) Biohazards in Biological Research 
(1973). A. Heilman, M. N. Oxman. and R. 
Pollack (ed.) Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory. 
[11} Handbook of Laboratory Safety (1971). 
Second Edition. N. V. Steere (ed.). The 
Chemical Rubber Co., Cleveland. 
[12) Bodily, J. L. (1970). General 
Administration of the Laboratuty, H. L. 
Bodily, E. L Updyke, and J. O. Mason (eds.), 
Diagnostic Procedures for Bacterial Mycotic 
and Parasitic Infections. American Public 
Health Association, New York, pp. 11-28. 
[13) Darlow, H. M. (1969). Safety in the 
Microbiological Laboratory. In J. R. Norris 
and D. W. Robbins (ed.). Methods in 
Microbiology, Academic Press, Inc., New 
York. pp. 169-204. 
[14) The Prevention of Laboratory 
Acquired Infection (1974). C. H. Collins, E. G. 
Hartley, and R. Pilsworth. Public Health 
Laboratory Service, Monograph Series No. 6. 
[15) Chatigny, M. A. (1961). Protection 
Against Infection in the Microbiological 
Laboratory: Devices and Procedures. In W. 
W. Umbreit (ed.). Advances in Applied 
Microbiology. Academic Press, New York, 
N.Y. 3:131-192. 
[10) Design Criteria for Viral Oncology 
Research Facilities (1975). U.S. Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare, Public 
Health Service, National Institutes of Health, 
DHEW Publication No. (NIH) 75-891. 
[17) Kuehne, R. W. (1973). Biological 
Containment Facility for Studing Infectious 
Disease. Appl. Microbiol. 26-239-243. 
[18) Runlde, R. S.. and G. B. Phillips (1969). 
Microbial Containment Control Facilities. 
Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York. 
[19) Chatigny, M. A., and D. 1. Clinger 
(1969). Contamination Control in 
Aerobiology. In R. L. Dimmick and A. B. 
Akers (eds.). An Introduction to Experimental 
Aerobiology. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
pp. 194-263. 
[19A) Horsfall, F. L., Jr., and J. H. Baner 
(1940). Individual Isolation of Infected 
Animals in a Single Room. J. Bact. 40. 569- 
580. 
[20) Biological safety cabinets referred to in 
this section are classified as Class I, Class II, 
or Class III cabinets. A Class / is a ventilated 
cabinet for personnel protection having an 
inward flow of air away from the operator. 
The exhaust air from this cabinet is filtered 
through a high-efficiency particulate air 
(HEPA) filter. This cabinet is used in three 
operational modes; (1) With a full-width open 
front, (2) with an installed front closure panel 
[ 306 ] 
