7 
Cr. Henry of the FOod and £>njg Administration (FOA) said that at this time he 
could not support the CDC/NIC6H document as written. Dr. Bems suggested that 
the dociOTent might be improved by stating general fermentation technology 
risk considerationB in the introduction. Reoonbinant ENA technology might 
then be reviewed in light of these general risk considerations, and problems 
associated with reoombinant HIA tetiinology would be placed in a general 
context. Cr. Landrigan eisked if such a report would be within the purview 
of the large-scale I^iew Working Gkoup. Cr. Bems felt it appropriate to 
place problems associated with reconbinant DNA technology in the context of 
problems associated with fiennentation technology. 
cr. HcKimey of the NIH Occupationjil Safety and Health Brandi noted that 
the Reoambinant INA Advisory Conmittee (RAC) currently deals only with bio- 
logical issues in large-scale processes; RAC was not considering processes, 
medical surveillance, etc. Rather, the large Scale Review Woricing Group 
ws formed to provide continued guidance to RAC in large-scale procedures as 
well as to assist in the development of the recombinant DA industry. In 
light of the wrking group mandate, it is critical that risk information be 
included in any dooirent forwarded to RAC by the Iarge-Sc^d.e Review Working 
Gkoup; a more coraplete evaluation would thus be provided. It is appropriate 
that NIG6H provide basic guidance in medical surveillance. In addition, 
Cr. HcKimey pointed out that reports on reconbinant DNA technology sen« to 
direct events in other areas of microbiology. These dC/NIOBH reconmendations 
therefore contribute to worker health and safety in microbiology in genered. 
( 375 ] 
