in the vast majority of R-DNA industrial applications. As far as 
detection of new illness is concerned, HIMA was led to conclude that 
since the risk in minimal, the population studied is small, and the 
exposures variable, therefore, the sensitivity and power of the system 
to detect illness is small. Waiting for an unknown disease to appear 
can be expensive and is potentially unrewarding. 
It is also important to point out that industrial applications of 
R-DNA are generally routine fermentations. Fermentation is not a new 
industry and most of the areas where problems can occur are alrady 
known. To say that the use of R-DNA derived microorganisms poses a new 
hazard would negate what has been distilled out of the RAC's 7 year 
history. That is, in essence, that any hazard in a R-DNA experiment 
is no greater than that of the most hazardous parental organism. 
Further, that is true only in the early research stages. By the time 
that a R-DNA containing microorganism reaches large-scale production, 
it is a well characterized entity. 
HIMA has several questions about specific components of the suggested 
surveillance program which should be answered before any final 
recommendations are put forth, such as: Who will pay for the exams 
and serum storage? How frequently should the exams occur? If groups 
will be small, how can long term epidemiological studies even be 
contemplated? Since each biotechnology project or company will be 
unique in terms of the organisms used and end products, how can NIOSH 
hope to pool all "biotechnology" industries for purposes of medical 
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