The Pubuc Heauth Research Institute 
OF THE City of New York. Inc. 
4BS FinST AVSNUC. NKW YOHK. N. V. lOOte 
tkl. (2121 UKXorBS 578-0842 
May 14, 1982 
Dr. Willicun J. Gartland, Jr. , Director 
Office tof Recombinant DNA Activities 
National Institute of General Medical Sciences 
National Institutes of Health 
Bethesda, Maryland 20205 
Dear Dr. Gartlemd: 
I am writing in strong support of the proposed amendment to section I-D of 
the NIH Guidelines, which would prohibit the construction of biological weapons 
by molecular cloning. 
It has long been my conviction that the greatest potential for misuse of the 
new biology lies not in laboratory accident, or in the escape of hazardous 
material, but rather in the deliberate construction of biological weaponry. 
The potential of molecular ^loning for biological weapons development is obvious, 
alaunning, and not sufficiently appreciated by the public. The technology is not 
only powerful, but the required meinipulations are relatively simple, inexpensive 
emd easily conducted in clandestine fashion. These considerations suggest that 
we may be on the brink of a new arms race which may conpound the suicidal dilemma 
already facing mankind in the nuclear age. This arms race would not be restricted 
to a few superpowers but would be accessible to the scientific personnel of many 
nations. 
In this context, we as biologists face an awesome responsibility, perhaps 
greater than that faced by the community of physicists during W.W. II, because 
we have lived through the nuclear era and cemnot pretend ignorance of the military 
consequences of our science. Our innocence was destroyed at Hiroshima. If we 
do not speak out now, history will surely condemn us. 
Although the dcmgers are great, the opportunity for us to voice our warning 
is also great. A new realization has affected the peoples of all countries 
concerning the dangers of modem warfare. In this context cin open stand by the 
biological community, amd by RAC in particular, would likely have considerable 
impact on the public. 
It is hoped that the adoption of the proposed amendment would bring pressure 
to bear on those scientists who might otherwise be tempted to cooperate in the 
development of biological weapons. It is also likely that members of Congress 
who are wavering on this issue would be influenced by adoption of the amen<3ment. 
Even if these arguments eure rejected and it is believed that adoption of the 
amendment will have no strong amd direct deterrent impact on misuse of recombinant 
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