PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE NIH GUIDELINES 
Section I-D shall be ameiided as follows: 
"I-D-7. The construction of biological weapons by molecular cloning." 
The rationale for this proposal is as follows: 
The experience of many scientists throughout the world during the past 
seven or eight years has demonstrated that the original fears of catastrophic 
laboratory accidents involving novel microorganisms constructed by molecular 
cloning were largely unfounded. 
Nevertheless, there remain grounds for concern in a few specific areas - 
three of which are correctly reflected in the currently operative version of 
the NIH guidelines. These three are: the transfer of clinically important 
antibiotic resistance to new species; the cloning of toxin determinants; and 
the deliberate release of recombinant organisms into the environment. A 
fourth area - one that is perhaps of greatest concern - has never been 
directly addressed by the RAC. This is the use of recombinant DNA technology 
for the development of new weapons of biological warfare. 
The potential of molecular cloning in this area has been apparent from 
the start; indeed it was an important consideration in the minds of many of 
the scientists at the Asllomar Conference who were involved in the initial 
framing of the guidelines. 
However, it was omitted from the guidelines, presumably because of the 
1972 treaty prohibiting the "development, production and stockpiling" of 
biological weapons. This treaty seemed to provide at least some assurance of 
security; however, the "development" prohibition is generally interpreted in 
military circles as applying only to the assembly of delivery vehicles. 
Laboratory research involving the construction of the organisms and the 
development of biological weapons for "defensive" (e.g., deterrent) purposes 
would be excluded. It is noted that the treaty was adopted before the advent 
of molecular cloning and that subsequently much of the U.S. military apparatus 
for biological warfare research and development was publicly dismantled. Most 
recently, however, the obvious potential of molecular cloning has led to a 
substantial renewal of military interest. 
It is our position that the use of molecular cloning for the deliberate 
construction of biological weapons is, per se, the most serious biohazard 
imaginable for this technology and that it constitutes an egregious misuse of 
scientific knowledge. 
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