Proposed Amendment to the NIH Guidelines - continued 
Page 2 
On the basis of these several considerations, tt Is proposed that the RAC 
adopt the above amendment explicitly prohibiting any use of molecular cloning 
for the development of biological weapons. 
Against this proposal, it may seem that the extant regulations applying 
to the cloning of toxins, the transfer of resistance, and the dissemination of 
recombinant organisms thoroughly cover the possible use of cloning In 
biological warfare. In fact, the coverage under these provisions Is grossly 
inadequate. On the one hand. It does not apply to agents of disease other 
than toxins; viruses, for example, have always been considered very attractive 
as biological weapons and their a priori attractiveness Is enhanced 
substantially by the potential of molecular cloning. On the other hand, since 
the only militarily credible use of biological weapons Involves surreptitious 
dissemination, the RAC prohibition against dissemination will certainly not 
Inhibit the military forces of any country. 
Admittedly, the adoption by the RAC of the proposed amendment will not 
directly Interdict any military Initiatives. It is nevertheless appropriate 
as an explicit public statement that could have several Important effects. 
It will provide automatic public support for a refusal of the scientific 
community to participate in the development of biological weapons; It may 
convince governments that the 1972 prohibition should be construed as applying 
to laboratory research as well as to the means of delivery; and It may 
encourage individual governments and international bodies such as the UN, 
NATO, SEATO, Warsaw Pact signatories, the OAS, etc., to reaffirm these 
International prohibitions legislatively or by treaty. 
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