1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2S 
represent the type of public responsibility in evaluating 
risk experiments which we think should serve as a model 
for other host-vector systems . The resulting reductions 
in contain lent levels, in our opinion, are justified, and 
are oased on sound principles of pathogenicity and 
epidemiology . 
'io recommend that in the continuing process of 
risk assessment that the appropriate experts as committee 
members or ad hoc committees be employed and that their 
evaluations continue to be exposed to public scrutiny. 
The use of workshops, special studies, open,, publicized 
meetings of tine Advisory Connittec are sound and appro- 
priate procedures to evaluate containment levels. 
The third area deals with the responsibil ity 
of the institutional biosafety committee. In testimony 
last year oefore the Kennedy Subconni tteo , we suggested that 
the IhC should have a leading role in assessing individual 
labora tor ies as to the adequacy of safety procedures anti 
appropriate levels of pnysical containment, biological 
contain -lent , provision of educat ionul materials, anti the 
revicv. of experimental design. 
We support these developments in the revised 
guidelines, ami reiterate that the local groups are more 
knowledgeable of tmo strengths and weaknesses of any 
scientific colleague than ±s possible frequently with a 
[ 117 ] 
