31 
1 unfortunately not entirely eliminated. The virus in 
2 England escaped through a so-called faulty filter, ami 
3 contaminated workers in and around tiie laboratory in 
4 Birmingham University. A medical photographer fell 
5 victim to this virus and died. The director of the 
g laooratory committed suicide. The threat from this 
7 outbreak even spread to the United States, when an 
0 individual exposed in England flew to North Dakota. 
9 This episode with smallpox parallels and 
10 highlights several concerns about research in the area 
11 of genetic manipulation. First, laos cannot provide 
12 foolproof containment of dangerous organisms. From the 
13 testimony we received as to the very sloppy procedures 
14 with respect to safety tr.at occur in many laborator ies , 
15 it is quite evident t'.iat surveillance and standards are 
16 highly necessary. 
17 Biohazard outbreak, secondly, unlike any other 
18 type of threat, can rapidly spread to virtually any neigh- 
19 borhood on earth. 
20 And third, the more over-opt inist ic the picture 
21 painted by the scientific community, the more vulnerable 
22 the public is to health disasters, especially from unpre- 
23 cedented genet ically-hybr id forms, against which nature 
24 may have evolved no mnmune mechanisms. 
25 I realize that stringent standards on this 
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