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1 The proposed revised guidelines, however, delegate 
2 substantial authority and flexibility to individual 
3 institutional biohazard committees, and lay the 
4 foundation for inconsistent protocols around the 
5 country. The IBC's are given the authority to choose 
6 between various containment combinations and to reduce 
7 containment levels at their discretion by one step for 
8 well-characterized clones. Such a system will inevi- 
9 tably lead to non-uniforn compliance, and a subsequent 
10 disrespect for the NIH guidelines. 
11 The IBC's are being entrusted with vast 
12 federal administrative power. Researchers and IBC's 
13 should follow uniform guidelines, not decide them. 
14 This applies equally to the inspection and oversight 
15 responsibilities given to the institutional biohazard 
16 commi ttees . It is the duty of IJIH to adninister a 
17 granting program, and to ensure compliance with the 
18 guidelines. This role cannot be delegated to its 
19 grantee institutions without raising serious conflicts 
20 of interest. 
21 We recommend that the membership of the 
22 Recombinant DMA Advisory Committee be expanded to 
23 include a greater proportion of representatives of 
24 the public interest, and individuals with knowledge 
25 in public policy. The decisions made by the Recombinant 
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