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1 Associate Professor of Biology at MIT and Director of 
2 the Biology Electron Microscope Facility. I have pub- 
3 lished papers in the area of microbial ecology, and in 
4 particular, survival of the micro-organisms in extreme 
5 environments such as Antarctica, as well as many papers 
6 on the structure and assembly of the viruses that are 
7 used as vectors in recombinant DNA research, and on 
g hazards of recombinant DNA research themselves. 
9 However, I have never served on an NIH committee in 
10 this area. I testify here as a member of the Steering 
11 Committee of the Coalition for Responsible Genetic 
12 Research. 
13 Reaping the potential benefits of recombinant 
DNA technology clearly requires containment of the poten- 
15 tial hazards. I find no substantial evidence or argument 
16 presented in the draft revised guidelines or supporting 
17 documents to justify the major weakening of containment 
16 proposed therein, such as reduction of containment for 
19 shotgun experiments with DNA from birds and mammals, and 
20 the lowering of containment for cloning of eukaryotic 
21 viral DNA's. 
22 The draft guidelines and supporting documents 
23 that are representing considerable labor and effort -- in 
24 many ways a very careful document — are marred by four 
25 major failings. One, the absence of the most relevant 
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