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1 that there are many possible subsets of susceptible indi- 
2 viduals in the population. These people are normal targets 
3 of infection. They include individuals receiving immuno- 
4 suppressive drugs as therapy , obviously newborn infants, 
5 premature infants, the elderly, et cetera. 
6 The guidelines make no mention of the problem of 
7 autoimmune disease, which I explicitly laid out and publishe 
8 in the proceedings of the Falmouth Conference. These are 
9 the baselines on which one might be concerned about the 
10 transfer, for example, of a gene coding for a human growth 
H hormone, somatostatin, or insulin into an indigenous strain 
12 of E. coli , and why it is important to contain these bugs. 
13 Now, two, in the absence of a scientific discus- 
14 sion of why one must contain the introduction of foreign 
15 genes introduced into K 12 , what we have is a continuous 
16 repetition of a logically fallacious and scientifically 
17 irresponsible argument. To wit, if we follow the guide- 
18 lines and clone in weakened strains, there is very little 
19 hazard. Therefore, there is very little hazard to recom- 
2Q binant DNA research in general. Therefore, we can weaken 
21 the guidelines, and not require debilitated organisms. 
22 Then this argument is repeated again and again, since in 
23 the somewhat less debilitated organism, EK 1 and EK 2 , there 
24 doesn't seem to be evidence for escape — that is, there 
25 is containment. Therefore, there is no hazard; therefore, 
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