3 
There has been some suggestions made that the Institutional Biosafety 
Committees are self-serving, ineffective, and in reality are only researchers 
regulating themselves. As chairman of the Beltsville Agricultural Research 
Center's Biosafety Committee I take exception to this suggestion. The member- 
ship of our committee was purposely made diverse and includes (1) individuals 
from a number of scientific disciplines, (2) individuals who are knowledgeable 
about laboratory safety and engineering principles, and (3) several laboratory 
technical staff. Our first recombinant DNA project submitted for certification 
to the committee was in fact returned twice for further elaboration before 
complete approval by the membership was given. Committee members recognize 
that such research may involve biohazards and are mindful of the public concern 
on recombinant DNA. Further, it is well recognized that it is essential all 
research involving the use of recombinant DNA molecules be conducted in a 
responsible manner, adhering to safety precautions and conditions designed to 
protect laboratory workers, the general public, and our environment. Earlier 
this year I had the opportunity to attend a Biosafety Committee meeting at the 
Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation in La Jolla, California. The Scripps 
biosafety committee had a similar profile and were extremely effective and non- 
partial in their deliberations. I am certain without any reservations that 
institutional biosafety committees can be relied upon for authoritative and 
proper implementation of the guidelines, provided those committees are required 
to be organized and established according to the current recommendations of the 
NIH. 
Lastly, some questions have arisen at the Agricultural Research Center 
concerning certain interpretations of the revised guidelines that relate to the 
specific scientific and research containment procedures that the proposed 
revisions require. The possibility of using recombinant DNA procedures for the 
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