(7) 
local as well as Federal surveillance has been 
inadequate to enforce these guidelines. As chair- 
man of the Harvard Biohazard Committee, Bernard N. 
Fields has pointed out in the Boston Globe, "Monitor- 
ing of compliance is on an honor system." That is 
hardly an "effective administrative mechanism." 
The proposed revision requiring one public member and recom- 
mending one non-doctoral staff person, chosen by the institution, 
is absolutely inadequate to ensure a balancing of perspectives. 
One public member on a committee of 9-15 will be intimidated, 
ignored, and outvoted continually. 
Recommendations : 
1. One third of the members of an IBC should represent the 
public and worker interests. The use of institutional scientists 
and environmental health and safety personnel as technical consul- 
tants has already been discussed in the Laboratory Monograph. 
This lessens the need to have the overwhelming percentage of the 
committee representing scientific expertise. The make-up and 
selection process should be specified in great detail in the 
guidelines. For example: 
One or more non-doctoral staff nominated by that population 
of workers. 
One or more "volunteer" representatives well-suited to repre- 
sent the public interest. 
One public health official and/or elected official. 
The public member should volunteer to ensure continuing inter- 
est and effectiveness. Notification of openings should be made in 
local media. Selection should be made by the local governing body 
or health department. 
2. One third of the members should represent scientific dis- 
ciplines related to risk assessment (e.g. epidemiologists, environ- 
mental health scientists, physicians with both research and clinical 
experience in infectious disease, microbial ecologists. 
3. One third should represent disciplines relevant to recom- 
binant DNA technology, biological safety, and engineering. 
4. The IBC must have all meetings publicized and open to the 
public except for those portions specifically dealing with confi- 
dential information. This should be required in the guidelines. 
Conclusion 
Until there is adequate representation of diverse interests 
on the decision-making bodies, oversight and regulation of recom- 
binant DNA research is a sham. The present proposed revisions do 
not adequately protect the public, the worker, and in the final 
analysis, the recombinant DNA researcher himself. 
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