in bacon. Nonetheless, once an unforseen hazard is identified in these 
technologies, they can, in principle, be halted. Not so with recombinant 
DNA technology. Once a dangerous recombinant escapes and finds an 
ecological niche, it is likely to be impossible to eradicate. 
We therefore recommend that not just basic research but also 
industrial and other applications involving recombinant DNA should be 
universally regulated with the force of law, in the public interest. 
Turning to the proposed revisions in the NIH guidelines, we would 
like to point out not only that some of them are potentially dangerous 
and unwarranted, but that they have been arrived at by unscientific methods 
that would never be judged acceptable for the establishment of even the 
most insignificant scientific facts. They are therefore all the more 
unsuitable for the establishment of scientific procedures where the public 
safety is concerned. After illustrating the unscientific basis for some 
of the revisions , we will return to the question of how to rectify the 
problem 
Firstly, a great deal of weight has been placed on semi-authorized 
reports of discussions held at closed scientific meetings, attended by a 
small number of selected participants. The outcome of these meetings, in general, 
appears to represent the "best guesses" of those present, most of whom were 
interested parties. The proceedings of the 
meetings were not published for the inspection and criticism of the 
entire scientific community before they were accepted as a basis for 
lowering safety precautions. In normal scientific practice, meetings and 
discussions of this kind are considered appropriate only as a basis for 
choosing the more promising concepts for future experimental investigation. 
Most scientists can think back to discussions of this kind where the 
consensus later turned out to be dead wrong. 
( 
i 
