In the case of shotgun experiments , containment reduction has been 
based on the unwarranted extrapolation of limited data. It is, to say the 
least, premature to conclude that all eukaryotic genes act through a 
messenger that cannot be processed in bacteria, and therefore cannot 
in bacteria. 
produce harmful products/ So far this has been shown for only a handful 
of genes, although there are a mill ion or so in a human cell. More 
importantly, the genes that have shown this behavior are of necessity 
the ones that are easiest to study, and these are all of special types; they 
make proteins in quantity for export outside the cell, or they are in 
viruses with restricti vely small genomes, etc. 
^ These special genes might require atypical 
controls and may therefore not be representative of all eukaryotic genes. 
We consider it scientifically irresponsible to jump to conclusions in this 
way for public relatiorupurposes^ when no reputable scientist would make 
such gross extrapolations in his own work. 
A few misguided scientists have not hesitated to make it clear that 
they regard the guidelines as mere window-dressing to allay unfounded public 
fears. These people are certainly entitled to their opinions as to the 
safety of recombinant DNA technology, but since they are opinions rather 
than knowledge based on established fact, there is no reason why they 
should be taken any more seriously than the opinions of less interested 
parties with a claim to greater objectivity. 
The fundamental problem with the guidelines and their revisions is 
that they have been entrusted to the NIH, the sponsor and promoter of 
progress in biological research (including recombinant DNA techniques), and 
to its Advisory Committee, which is composed largely of scientists working 
with recombinant DNA or in closely related fields. A confl ict of interest 
is bound to occur, for it is only natural that these groups will appreciate 
[ 377 ] 
