To the dismay of all participants, the recombinant DNA 
controversy has become overheated and polarized. The public 
| 
is wary and in most instances does not understand what the 
risks are about and how they can be reduced. This situation 
i 
is only aggravated when the NIH fails to make all the relevant 
facts available, fails to afford the critics an opportunity 
to be party to the deliberations, and fails to allow the 
public time to digest and review the complex information 
required for an informed evaluation. 
AVAILABLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A GENERAL LOWERING OF 
CONTAINMENT LEVELS; MANY QUESTIONS OF RISK ARE STILL UNRESOLVED 
Contrary to what seems to be the prevailing dogma, the 
experimental results and scientific meetings leave many 
unanswered issues about risk to be resolved. 
While there was general agreement at the June 1977 
Falmouth conference on "Risk Assessment of Recombinant DNA 
Experimentation with Escherichia coli K12" that E. coli K12 
could not be inadvertently converted into an epidemic human 
pathogen by recombinant DNA experimentation (F: 609-714; esp. 
699-703) , the participants at that same conference did identify 
several areas where there remains reason for caution. These 
include the following possibilities: (i) recombinant 
plasmids might be transferred to more virulent strains of 
bacteria (F: 648-654; 686-687; 668-675; 704-714 and n.4); 
(ii) bacteria or viruses containing recombinant DNA could 
4/ E.S. Anderson, Nature , 255 (1975), 502-504. 
[A- 183 ] 
