cause autoimmune diseases (F: 663-667); (iii) viral DNA 
cloned in E. coli may retain its infectivity (F: 704-714) ; and 
(iv) the virulence of experimental E. coli strains may be 
increased by recombinant DNA, thus endangering the people 
directly exposed to the experimental bacteria (F: 704-714) . 
As we have already noted, several excellent experiments to 
assess these risks were proposed at the Falmouth conference. 
Others need to be proposed and- carried out to assess the 
hazards that may be presented to a wider range of organisms 
in the biosphere. 
Knowledge about the possibility of a transfer of 
recombinant plasmids to wild bacteria has been overestimated, 
and the risks prematurely discounted. Until the natural processes 
of genetic transfer are better understood, we shouldn't place 
too much confidence in the integrity of biological containment. 
As Professor King of MIT commented at the Falmount conference: 
The danger of recombinant DNA research is not 
one of making K12 into a pathogen; this argument 
has been raised as a straw man. As Dr. Anderson 
mentioned, the real question is the transfer of 
genes into the indigenous flora. This flora is 
already adapted to the host. The ecological 
problem is the transmission and routing of plasmids. 
(F: 701) 
And, as Professor King and Professor Goldstein of Harvard 
Medical School wrote to NIH's new Recombinant D NA Technical 
Bulletin : 
[A-184] 
