Though there was general consensus 
[at Falmouth] that the conversion of E. coli K12 
itself to an epidemic strain is unlikely (though 
not impossible) on the basis of available data, 
there was not consensus that transfer to wild 
strains is unlikely. On the contrary, the evidence 
presented indicated that this is a serious concern. 1 ' 
There are several reasons to be wary of such transfers. 
Wild strains of E. coli that do not cause diarrhea are the 
major source of both community- and hospital-acquired infections 
in the United States; and diarrhea-causing strains are more 
prevalant in developing nations. The most common community- 
acquired E. coli infections requiring hospitalization are those 
of the urinary tract, lower respiratory tract, and skin 
(F: 634-638) . Nondiarrheagenic strains may also colonize 
the gut but are not pathogenic there. 
Generally, we conclude that there needs to be more study 
of gene transfer in the environment. In our section VI. E 
below, we will present the technical basis for our concern 
that novel DNA may in fact be incorporated in wild strains 
and make explicit recommendations to enhance the safety of many 
experiments . 
In addition we wish to echo Professor Sinsheimer's repeated 
concern that the NIH guidelines are derived from an "extraordinary 
anthropocentric" point of view.— ^ The reliance on the Falmouth 
deliberations compound this narrow interpretation of the hazards. 
The Falmouth conference only addressed the risks of E. coli to 
humans and not to the diverse microorganisms which may be 
susceptible to interaction with novel genetic combinations. 
5/ Recombinant DNA Technical Bulletin, 1 (Fall 1977), 24. 
6/ N. Wade, Science, 201 (1978), 601. 
[A-185] 
