rigorous level of their training, it is obvious that spread of 
R-DNA-molecule-containing organisms outside the laboratory is 
almost inevitable, if the host organism can find a suitable 
ecological niche. We know incredibly little about the ecology 
of organisms like E . co 1 i and the few experiments with healthy 
volunteers are entirely insufficient to make any important policy 
decisions . 
It is stated in the Federal Register notice (p . 33128, col 3) 
that training courses for biosafety officers and standards of 
training and uniform certification procedures are now being 
undertaken "carefully and in stages." While this deliberation and 
care are most appropriate, until this process is completed there 
should be no relaxation of any kind of the NIH guidelines, while 
at the same time those requirements in the Proposed Revisions that 
strengthen safety requirements, like the prohibition of mouth- 
pipetting should be retained. 
Recommendation : There should be no change in the current NIH 
guidelines unless and until uniform and consistent training 
guidelines and certification procedures are established for 
biosafety officers and all R-DNA laboratory workers at the P-2 
and higher level. 
(2) The detection of untoward events (epidemiological monitoring ) : 
The recent tragic case in England of small-pox acquired by a 
non- laboratory worker on the next floor from the laboratory where 
the virus was under investigation demonstrates once again that there 
is much to be learned about how organisms might escape from 
supposedly secure facilities (to date the mechanism of the small-pox 
episode has not been determined) . This underlines the urgency and 
[A— 250] 
