4.5 The demand for training is difficult to judge and flexible arrangements will 
be needed Training facilities will necessarily be found mostly in uni\ersities 
and polytechnics although industrial employers and appropriate Go\ernment 
laboratories will also have a part to play. Universities and polytechnics are 
already providing some related courses and. suitably modified, these should be 
appropriate. The GMAG will need to be aware of the general nature of the 
training being provided since this will be relevant in the consideration of advice 
on individual experiments. They should also maintain a register of training 
courses and facilities and be prepared to provide information and advice 
about training. 
5. CENTRAL ADVICE AND CONTROL 
5.1 The Ashby Report (paragraph 6.5(d)) suggested that "as an initial step a 
widely publicised advisory service, perhaps otfered by public health laboratories, 
would help to safeguard the interests of the public and of those engaged in the 
experiments". The Government has already accepted that it has a responsi- 
bility to ensure that authoritative advice and guidance are available to labora- 
tories using the techniques available for genetic manipulation and we were 
asked to make recommendations for the establishment of a central advisory 
service 
5.2 We were also asked to consider the practical aspects of applying in appro- 
priate cases the controls advocated by the Working Party on the Laboratory 
Use of Dangerous Pathogens, which recommended that initially control should 
be on the basis of voluntary acceptance by laboratories of the advice of a 
centrally appointed Dangerous Pathogens Advisory Group (DPAG). but that 
various existing legal powers which could be invoked to give statutory force to 
such advice should "be consolidated so that the Departments of Health and 
Agriculture can act with full authority, without delay and with uniform 
principles.”* 
A voluntary system of advice and control 
5.3 W'e recommend the establishment of a Genetic Manipulation Advisory 
Group (GMAG). Since a central advisory service will need to command the 
respect of the public as well as of the scientific community, including scientists 
in industry, the membership of the GMAG should include not only scientists 
with knowledge both of the techniques in question and of relevant safety 
precautions and containment measures but also individuals able to take account 
of the interests of employees and the general public. We hope that the Govern- 
ment will agree to the establishment of the GMAG on this basis at an early 
date so that work which is scientifically desirable may proceed quickly and 
safely. 
5.4 The main functions of the GMAG should be to advise on the category 
into which a particular experiment would fall, taking into account the factors 
discussed in Section 2 above and on the application to particular cases of the 
code of practice recommended in Section 3 above. To do this the GMAG will 
need to maintain records of the facilities available in different laboratories and 
the qualifications of Biological Safety Officers: in time n should in effect estab- 
lish a register of approved laboratories. It should also review experimental 
protocols regularly as part of a continuing assessment of precautions which 
• Report of the Working Party on the Laboratory Use of Dangerous Pathogens, 
paragraph 61 . 
IV-15 
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