Sections of the guidelines where such statements would apply 
include but are not limited to: 
II. , D. , - Distribution of Certified Host-Vectors. 
III., B. , 1. , c. » Lowering of Containment Levels... 
IV., A., 1st paragraph, subsection (vi) Submitting Information... 
IV., B. , 5th paragraph - Minutes of the Meetings... 
II. Containment. 
D. Biological Containment. 
1. Levels of Containment, 
a. HV1. 
In general, this section is rather vague. What specifically is 
meant by "low potential for survival?" Also, are HV1 hosts meant 
to be wild type organisms or are they meant to harbor containment 
mutations? If HV1 host-vector systems are meant to be wild type, 
we propose that this section might, for example, be reworded as 
follows: "Hosts should be wild type species or derivatives thereof 
which are non-pathogenic for plants or animals and which do not 
contain, conjugative plasmids or generalized transducing phage. 
Vectors should he non-con jugative plasmids or bacteriophages". 
If KV1 hosts are intended to harbor containment mutations, then we 
propose that an HVO host-vector system be defined. An HVO system 
could then employ a wild type non-pathogenic organism with a non- 
conjugative plasmid or bacteriophage vector. Experiments requiring 
PS+HV1 could then be carried on under P3+HV0 containment. We also 
suggest that HVO systems should not require certification by the 
HIH, but approval at the local biohazards committee level. 
[Appendix A — 41] 
