30 Barefoot Hill Road 
Sharon, Massachusetts 02067 
21 December 1977 
Donald S. Fredrickson, M.D. 
Director, National Institutes of Health 
9000 Rockville Pike 
Bethesda, Maryland 20014 
Dear Doctor Fredrickson: 
I want to thank you for the opportunity to address the N.I.H. Recombinant DNA 
Molecule Program Advisory Committee. 
As I indicated Thursday, 15 December 1977, I am the Biohazard Assessment Officer 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a consultant to the Biohazard 
Safety Office at Harvard University. My association with M.I.T. began on 1 March 
1977, and at Harvard on 1 July 1977. Prior to this I was a clinical microbiologist 
at Lederle Laboratories, and a member of their recombinant DNA committee. I have 
enclosed a copy of my curriculum vitae which describes my background in the biolo- 
gical sciences. 
At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology my major responsibility is to develop 
a service oriented department, dedicated to biohazard control. The impressions and 
insights that I have developed as a result of interviewing and meeting with researchers 
and the public proved to he of uncalculatable value, as I have attempted to establish 
my presence at M.I.T. 
It is not my intention to try and impress you. I merely want to indicate that the 
comments that I offer concerning the draft revised guidelines are based on many 
months of reviewing M.U.A.'s, interaction with the City of Cambridge Biohazard 
Committee, and discussions on recombinant DNA with scientists, both from my Insti- 
tution as well as other Institutions in the country. 
General Comments: 
1) I agree whole heartily with the new definition of recombinant DNA. 
2) I would exempt all P-1 experiments from the Guidelines. 
3) I feel that the exemption clause is vital if meaningful risk assessment 
experiments are to be initiated in a reasonable period of time. 
4) In general, I am in favor of downgrading the containment classifications. I 
feel that the draft revision is too stringent in the viral and plant sections. 
5) I believe that political factors have influenced the P.ecombinant DNA Advisory 
Group to the point of obscuring scientific judgement. I am refering to the 
[Appendix A — 141] 
