2. April 19, 1978 
Stanley Falkow 
I wish to emphasize to you that all of the monitoring, survival studies, 
and transfer experiments were performed with ordinary E_. col i K-12 rather than 
the certified EK-2 strain, XI 776. Hence, since studies wi th ordinary E_. col i 
K-12 are found to be negative, X1776 must represent a rather good case of 
"overkill". Analogous EK-2 strains have been developed in Great Britain by 
Sidney Brenner. 
Upon my arrival in Bristol, England in June, 1978 to begin my sabbatical 
leave from the University of Washington, I shall correllate the data from 
participating laboratories into a single paper that will be submitted 
for publication by September, 1978. I am glad to be able to tell you that the 
risk assessment monitoring has proved to be so uniformly negative. We would 
be pleased, of course, to learn whether you or others feel that further moni- 
toring data is required. Of course, further risk assessment experimentation 
is required but hopefully this will address other questions of safety. 
Aside from these positive aspects of my travel, I confess that, in 
another vein I found the meetings most distressing. It is painfully obvious 
that because of the very restrictive nature of the NIH guidelines, as well as 
the beauracratic wall that the guidelines have spawned, American biologists 
can no longer expect to keep pace with either Western European or East 
European science. That is not to say that other countries have not adopted 
research guidelines. They most certainly have. Yet, the guidelines adopted 
by the European community and the USSR retain a flexibil ity and a scientific 
reality that is absent from our own. Nor do I believe that the European or 
Soviets are any less concerned about safety than we. It seems, however, that 
they learned valuable lessons from our mistakes. It is difficult for me to 
convey to you the intense discomfort many of us felt when we heard the results 
of reasonable, totally safe experiments being described by Western and East 
European scientists that are now literally forbidden to U.S. scientists. 
Perhaps the adoption of the pending revised NIH guidelines will rectify, 
in part, these discrepencies. It is unfortunate that the Congress has received 
a good deal of inaccurate information about the history of the guidelines and 
were subjected mostly to the two extreme views of recombinant DNA technology. 
Many of us will continue to work towards a rational solution of the 
recombinant DNA controversy. Yet, there is but so much time that one can 
afford to spend on such "political" matters without giving up science and our 
obligations to our students and families. I believe I told you that most of 
us who were involved in the Asilomar Meeting and in drafting the first set of 
NIH guidelines could be described as "walking wounded". I thought many of 
my wounds had healed but, after this trip, I fear my wounds have been re-opened. 
I believe that if Congress passes legislation regulating recombinant DNA research, 
American biological science will be adversely affected for several years to 
come. 
Although we are falling behind, it is a tribute to our younger scientists 
that they persevere in the face of beauracratic adversity and continue to 
perform brilliant, innovative experiments. But these young scientists are 
[Appendix A — 285] 
