4 
more' imminent than risks which have been hypothesized although 
there are so few data available at this time that no absolute conclu- 
sions can be derived. In any event, the research and its evolving 
technologies are not limited to the United States and thus actions 
in this Nation alone cannot be the final determining factor. The 
impact, whether beneficial or harmful, will be worldwide in nature 
and will require continuous cooperation and evaluation at an inter- 
national level. A good start at such an international exchange of 
information and cooperation appears to have been initiated. 
The Subcommittee concludes that the research should continue 
to be supported in as positive a fashion as is possible. The current 
high level of communication and vigilance between scientists and 
laV persons should be maintained. Despite the strong tone of the 
criticism of scientists conducting this research (however, see also 
the section qi this report which refers to post-hearing developments), 
there atb : plear instances of a recognition of potential problems and 
socially responsible actions have beep taken by both private and 
commercial investigators. For example, an investigator in a com- 
mercial laboratory who had developed a special cellulase-containing 
form of E, coli (by non-recombinant DNA methods) which might 
have’ had a commercial value did not pursue this lead because of 
a perception of potential environmental risk. In other research, 
the construction of an hybrid between a tumor virus (SV40) and an 
adenovirus (a cold causing virus) as a useful tool for mapping gene 
structure was offered for research use only under safety agreements; 
a proposed insertion of the SV40 tumor virus into E. coli for study of 
the virus structure was not completed because of a perception of 
potential risk and. actually was one of the proposed experiments 
wfiich led to the scientific evaluation of the potential risks of recom- 
binant DNA research and the development of the NIH guidelines. 
T?he Subcommittee does not believe that the burden of proof of 
safety should be borne only by the proponents of this area of investi- 
gation; In the absence of proof to the contrary, the right of freedom 
of inquiry is so important in our society that great care needs to be 
taken in any proposed restrictions of this freedom. However, oppo- 
nents of research should have an equal opportunity iii grant proposals 
to initiate research to attempt to develop data to evaluate their 
speculations of unusual risks. 
The Subcommittee recognizes that all research is not automatically 
S rotected and that there are precedents for restriction of research. 
'or example, national support of offensive biological warfare research 
was terminated when international negotiations led to a decision to 
outlaw such activities. Many categories of human experimentation are 
very carefully regulated in this country. Other forms of control, such 
as required licensing for the use of radioisotopes in research, have been 
imposed. However, the biomedical community has an excellent record 
of reacting to and coping with unexpected dangers. The investiga- 
tions of pathogens “from the streets of Philadelphia to the villages of 
southern Sudan and northern Ziaire” (Legionnaires disease, and the 
highly infectious and lethal African hemorrhagic, Lassa, and Marburg 
fevers) in recent times are evidence of the scope of successful albeit 
very risky research of great social value. These, and new forms of old 
[Appendix B — 55] 
