40 
when an inquiry obviously has implications for society which can- 
not be clearly defined as entailing no risk. Since science now has a 
formidable impact on society, it will be necessary for those responsi- 
ble for establishing science policy to give greater consideration to 
the social implications of scientific developments. 
Mr. Dyson 
Freeman J. Dyson, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, is 
of the opinion that the issue of the right to freedom of inquiry is a 
false issue in the debates produced by the DNA recombinant mole- 
cule research. He believes that those involved in research recognize 
that society has already exercised some control over scientific inquiry. 
The problem is really one of how much of a limitation on inquiry 
is possible without interfering with the stimulus necessary to en- 
courage basic research. Neither does Mr. Dyson agree that the 
risks of DNA recombinant research may be unprecedented. He sug- 
gested that the attempted control of the atomic secrets is an example 
of a classic failure of society to prevent or control the use of a dan- 
gerous technique. Despite some of the most rigorous securitj" methods 
which could be conceived and implemented, the security system came 
to be treated with contempt, and the secrets are now held world- 
wide. He believes that the inflexibility of the controls used in the 
attempt to control atomic secrets was a primary reason for the failure 
of this control system. He suggests that a more flexible and humane 
approach to regulation of DNA recombinant research would be 
more successful. He would favor legislation which would permit 
maximum flexibility for the exercise of judgment for both operation 
and enforcement of controls. 
Dr. Michael phrased his concern about present estimates of risks 
which affect later generations in a different way during the discussions 
which followed the formal testimony. He indicated that responsible 
judgments on risks will depend increasingly on estimates of longer 
range futures. Because of this requirement, there is a need to give 
more consideration to alternative futures and to make explicit in the 
analysis which alternate futures were examined in selecting a particular 
policy. Then, as the future moves closer to reality, reexamination of 
those analyses will be required so that the analyses may be modified 
by nearer term dat a. This would mean, as highlighted by Dr. Lowrance, 
that the Congress needs to provide leadership in setting priorities. In 
the case of the DNA issue, this might mean that the Congress would 
categorize research experiments in terms of potential risk, and also in 
terms of potential social value. Where the risk is very small, the 
experiments might be permissible. If there is obvious social value in 
conducting the experiment (e.g., experiments to deter min e more 
precisely what the risks of recombinant DNA research are, or experi- 
ments directly relevant to the treatment of disease), a slightly larger 
risk may be acceptable. If these permissible experiments are carried 
out and show that the risks are less than originally thought, other 
experiments, perhaps slightly more risky or having less obvious social 
value, might then be authorized (e.g., experiments directed towards 
improving the nitrogen-fixing capabilities of plants where at some 
time it may be necessary to release new organisms into the 
environment) . 
[Appendix B — 89] 
