45 
may even have been an increase in uncertainty and confusion. Ms. 
Nelkin reported, however, that the Swedish surveys did suggest that 
the programs may have abated some of the hostile antinuclear activity. 
A different approach to the antinuclear protests was taken by the 
Netherlands government. In that country, the Minister of Physical 
Planning set up a system requiring publication of all policy intentions 
before physical planning could proceed. [In some respects, this pro- 
gram sounds like one of the objectives of the U.S. Environmental 
Impact Statement requirements.] The Dutch policy objectives pub- 
lications were intended to address such issues as economic growth, 
project objectives, and impacts, and were circulated for public com- 
ment. The public response was then evaluated by a representative 
council with members from worker groups and voluntary organiza- 
tions. Hearings were held to examine the public comments. The 
results of the hearings were then publicized to insure that the original 
intent of the responses had not been modified by the council. The 
final response was provided to the Minister who had to respond or 
change the plans, with the Parliament making final decisions. 
According to Ms. Nelkin, the Austrian approach was somewhat 
analogous to the U.S. "science court” concept. In Austria, the Minister 
of Industry constructed lists of questions which had been solicited 
from the opponents of nuclear power. Teams of experts representing 
both pro and con positions then prepared for and conducted televised 
debates. The Ministry prepared informative background information 
for public distribution preceding the televised debates to assist in the 
understanding of technical terms. Public response was solicited, and 
then a report was prepared to summarize the issues which had been 
resolved and those which remained controversial. Ms. Nelkin indi- 
cated that, as in Sweden, conflict still remained although it was the 
hope that public examination of the issues would enable the public 
to see more clearly the limits to the expert opinions on both sides of 
the debate. 
These special attempts at involving the public in the nuclear debates 
were accompanied by a number of other efforts in all three countries. 
For example, special efforts were made to involve consumer groups in 
an assortment of government councils and outside evaluation groups 
of various kinds were invited to participate. Ms. Nelkin summarized 
the conclusions which appeared to be most obvious from these experi- 
ments. First, science policies are intrinsically controversial, and the 
furnishing of technical information is not sufficient alone to resolve 
conflict or change public attitudes; however, the participatory process 
does serve to bring better focus to the issues of concern and may serve 
to reduce hostility and polarization. Second, the use of experts is a 
crucial political resource. Public access to technical experts must be 
improved. Third, the values derived from public involvement must 
be carefully examined. The balance between the need for public in- 
volvement and the possibility that the decision process may be slowed 
or made more complex must be carefully examined. Despite all of 
these cautions, Ms. Nelkin indicated that there is little doubt that the 
desire for public involvement is spreading and, as indicated by the high 
level of interest in DNA recombinant research, even basic research is 
not immune to public examination. 
[Appendix B — 94] 
