41 
H.E. 11192 does not mandate that the Secretary of HEW promul- 
gate regulations to protect the safety of laboratory workers. The bill 
is silent on this issue. H.E. 7897, by contrast, did require the Secre- 
tary to issue regulations to protect the safety of laboratory workers. 
Compliance with such regulations was made a pre-condition to ob- 
taining a license to conduct recombinant DNA research. 
Eecombinant DNA experimentation, just like research on radio- 
active isotopes, has potential benefits, and many unknown risks. Those 
who must work in recombinant DNA facilities to make a living de- 
serve protection from potential hazards. 
According to testimony at the DNA hearings held in 1977 by the 
House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, both the Na- 
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Labor 
Department have informed Dr. Frederickson at NIH that the NIH 
guidelines have not adequately addressed the occupational safety and 
health issues raised by recombinant DNA experimentation. 
Many workers involved in recombinant DNA experiments at the 
present time have no statutory protection. The Occupational Safety 
and Health Act does not cover work by individual scientists, or re- 
search conducted at many public universities. State, county and mu- 
nicipal employees are not presently covered by the Federal occupa- 
tional health and safety program. 
Many students and employees at recombinant DNA laboratories 
are nonunion, or they may belomg to separate unions. Without uniform 
union representation, it will be difficult for employees to enforce safe 
working conditions. H.E. 11192 eliminates protective provisions in 
H.E. 7897 which allowed an employee to report violations of the NIH 
guidelines by his employer with impunity. Under H.E. 11192 an 
employee risks being fired or demoted for reporting violations of the 
NIH guidelines. This makes H.E. 11192 once enacted even more diffi- 
cult to enforce. 
Dr. John F. Finklea, when he was still Director of NIOSH, gave 
excellent testimony at the DNA hearings held by the House Subcom- 
mittee on Health and the Environment in 1977 on potential hazards to 
lab workers conducting DNA experiments. NIOSH determines what 
physical and chemical hazards are present in the workplace, what ad- 
verse effects they produce, and how workers are best protected from 
such effects. 
Dr. Finklea suggested that the potential risks to recombitant DNA 
workers were substantial enough that an effective medical surveillance 
system should be created. He wanted records of exposure kept, so that 
any outbreak of disease among recombinant DNA workers could be 
well monitored. It is believed that chronic disease patterns might 
occur in such workers many years later, and that this should be moni- 
tored by the Federal- Government or the employer. 
Based o(n Dr. Finklea’s testimony, we believe the protection of stu- 
dents and Avorkers engaged in recombinant DNA is an urgent need 
which should be addressed by any federal legislation on this subject. 
We quote key passages in Dr. Finklea’s testimony to justify our 
concern : 
“We have found that private industries, including some of 
these corporations conducting or planning recombinant DNA 
research, have not always voluntarily and quickly dealt with 
[Appendix B— 171] 
