42 
other occupational safety and health problems. For example, 
one corporation contacted assured NIOSH that medical rec- 
ords for recombinant DNA research workers would be made 
available and therefore no central registry of such workers 
was necessary. This corporation at the same time took legal 
action disputing our authority for access to employment and 
mental records necessary to evaluate health risks at a plant 
with an apparent increase in cancer among the workers. This 
cancer had been reported to Federal authorities by workers in 
that plant .” 1 
■ Later JDr. Finklea, testified that such disregard for worker safety 
was not an isolated incident : 
We have had communications that suggest that research 
laboratories do not provide for adequate control for a number 
of regulated or suspected carcinogens. State officials and our 
own Institute have pointed out that teaching laboratories in 
our educational institutions have not done all that is neces- 
sary to prevent exposures to potentially harmful chemi- 
cals. . . . 
In general, occupational safety and health programs 
among universities do not seem as well developed as those in 
industry 
If there should be significant risks to health arising from 
recombinant DNA research, we could become aware of such 
hazards in several ways. Isolated cases or an outbreak of 
clinical illness among workers or in the community might 
be the first indicator 
The present reporting system for laboratories is entirely 
voluntary. Isolated cases and even fatalities associated with 
laboratory exposures to infectious diseases are from time to 
time reported 
The present voluntary reporting system would probably 
not be adequate to detect a subtle increase in infectious dis- 
orders that are frequent, not particularly severe, or not easily 
associated with the infectious agent being investigated in the 
laboratory . 2 3 
Those of us who dissent from the Interstate and Foreign Com- 
merce Committee Report respectfully submit that recombinant DNA 
organisms may prove, like chemical carcinogens, radioactive sub- 
stances, and slow viruses, to have the capability to increase the risk 
of disease many years after exposure. There is no way to prove what 
this risk may be at the present time. Clearly, DNA legislation should 
protect laboratory workers from the potential risks of such exposure. 
The protection they could have under NIH safety guidelines should 
not be arbitrarily removed when the Secretary of HEW issues an 
order exempting certain experiments from the NIH guidelines. 
In summary, those of us who dissent from the Committee Report 
do SO in the belief that the unknown risks of recombinant DNA 
1 Recombinant DNA Research Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health 
and the Environment of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of 
Representatives, 95th Congress, First Session, March 15, 16, and 17, 1977, p. 290-291. 
3 Id. at 291-92. 
[Appendix B — 172] 
