22 
remains much more difficult to fashion legislation to protect society 
against its fears than it is to protect it against known dangers. With 
DXA research, the very existence, much less the magnitude and na- 
ture, of the risks presented are yet a matter of speculation. 
While scientists may be at ease with the knowledge that the statis- 
tical probability of some event occurring is “ten-to-the-minus-what- 
ever, many people are not — and what is needed is an orderly demon- 
stration of just what those risks are. All participants in the debate 
over recombinant DXA research need better information about actual 
risks in real experiments. Public anxiety, initially generated by the 
scientists, cannot be reversed until this information is available and 
subjected to adequate peer review. 
Developing scientific information on the risks or lack thereof in 
recombinant DXA research requires flexibility in regulation. H.R. 
11192 provides the flexibility. The specific authority granted in this 
section to issue exemptions for high-risk assessment experiments in 
high-containment conditions is an essential feature of the bill. 
Section 108. Relationship to Other Federal Laws 
The committee amended this section to add a new subsection (c) 
that assures that all parts of Title I expire at the end of the two-year 
period encompassed by the legislation. Without this provision certain 
sections of Title I would apparently remain in force indefinitely. 
Section 201. Establishment of a Study Commission 
The committee amended this section to make the President, instead 
of the Secretary, the authority to appoint members of the genetic 
manipulation study Commission. The amendment was prompted in 
order to assure a broader input of recommendations for Commission 
membership. Since considerable genetic research is done or supported 
by agencies of government other than NIH. it appeared reasonable 
that their representatives have a voice, through the President, in 
making recommendations. The Commission itself, however, is retained 
under the Secretary of HEW. 
One of the criticisms of the early reactions of potential risk in 
recombinant DXA research was that those with broad experience in 
the transmission of contagious disease were not brought in to examine 
the. potential hazards of work with an organism such as Escherichia 
coli, the primary host in most recombinant DXA work. If such in- 
dividuals had participated in the early evaluations, perceptions of 
risk might have been quite different. There is every reason to believe 
that an alternative microorganism or several microorganisms even- 
tually might be certified for work in recombinant DXA research. If 
the Commission is to function effectively in its evaluative tasks, per- 
sons should be appointed to it who have a working knowledge of the 
field of genetic manipulation. In this regard the Science and Technol- 
ogy Committee supports the views as expressed in the Commerce Com- 
mittee report on this legislation. 
The committee thus believes that the provisions for appointment of 
individuals to the Commission should be broad enough to include op- 
portunities to appoint individuals who are expert in the fields of epi- 
demiology, molecular biology, and microbiology as well as the other 
fields suggested in H.R. 11192 as reported by the Commerce Comrnit- 
[Appendix B — 210] 
