31 
to an institutional biosafety committee. These committees commonly 
include researchers engaged in recombinant DNA work, other knowl- 
edgeable scientists, members of professional school or liberal arts fac- 
ulties, and, in some instances, public members, although the guide- 
lines do not specify their composition or appointment procedures. 
In all cases, service is voluntary and in addition to members’ other 
responsibilities. 
Xearlv all of the subco mmi ttee’s witnesses, including representatives 
of the private sector, supported a provision for onsite review commit- 
tees, though for somewhat different reasons. Many scientists regard the 
biosafety committee as an essential instrument of self -regidat ion. 
others as a mechanism for employee participation and public scrutiny. 
Some observers question whether a part-time committee, most of whose 
members have close ties to the institution and researchers engaged in 
recombinant DNA work, can be expected to monitor the research care- 
fully and enforce the regulations vigorously. Thus, there is moderate 
disagreement, not only about the committees’ composition but also 
about their functions and accountability. Harlyn Haivorson, speaking 
for the American Society of Microbiology, recommended that each 
biosafety committee include public representatives but have a major- 
ity of members with “technical expertise in the activities conducted at 
the institution in question.” King considered it “* * * imperative that 
laboratory workers be fully involved in decisionmaking proc- 
esses * * *. Their representatives must sit on biohazard commit- 
tees * * *.” Marshall Shapo observed, from his own experience on 
the University of Virginia biohazard committee, “* * * It (is) im- 
portant that we give opportunities for intrainstitutional collegial dis- 
cussion, and we also * * * provide for some kind of independent 
review outside of the institution, so that the people who are doing the 
review are not people who are in any substantial way beholden to 
those who are doing the research.” 
Role of State and local governments 
In their testimony before the subcommittee, representatives of both 
the American Society for Microbiology and the Pharmaceutical Man- 
ufacturers Association predicated their support of legislation on its 
preemption of State and local laws imposing greater restrictions on 
recombinant DNA activities than those provided by the Federal 
standards. Harlyn Haivorson stated, “It is our fear that if this is not 
done, we will see a patchwork of conflicting laws regulating micro- 
organisms which recognize no political or geographical boun- 
dary * * *. Excessive and variable restrictions would increase the 
cost of recombinant DNA research and could lead, in many cases, to 
abandonment of such research.” Joseph Stetler of the PMA agreed, 
“A proliferation of State or local laws and regulations would prob- 
ably not increase safety, but it could seriously impede the development 
of the potential benefits of this new technology.” 
Public interest group representatives were equally insistent that 
States and localities be permitted to impose stricter standards. Marcia 
Cleveland of the Natural Resources Defense Council argued that leav- 
ing the way open for State and local regulation is essential as an ave- 
nue for public participation and political outlet for public opposition. 
“* * * When citizens are aroused about the hazards of recombinant 
[Appendix B — 290] 
