57 
ATTACHMENT A 
The DNA Research Scare 
(By Bernard D. Davis*) 
Four years ago a group of molecular biologists publicly expressed 
grave concern over the potential dangers of research with recombinant 
DNA, a novel technique that allowed a small amount of DNA, the 
material of which genes are made, from any organism, to be incor- 
porated into a bacterium. At their urging the National Institutes 
of Health issued an elaborate set of guidelines, forbidding the forma- 
tion of certain kinds of recombinants and placing various restrictions 
on others. And last spring Congress was framing legislation carrying 
additional restrictions and harsh penalties. 
But the NIH is now considering substantial relaxation of the guide- 
lines. congressional committees are considering much milder legisla- 
tion. and the need for any legislation is increasingly questioned. It is 
important to know why the dangers seem so much smaller today. 
First, people for several years have been making recombinants in 
many laboratories, without a single resulting illness. It is clear that 
the predicted dangers remain entirely hypothetical. 
Second, the recombinant technique is increasingly recognized as a 
tool of great versatility, comparable to the use of radioactively labeled 
molecules in studying the chemical processes in living systems. For 
example, recombinants make it possible to isolate human genes. More- 
over. they also make it possible to study the action and the regulation 
of these genes in the thousandfold simpler background of a bacterial 
cell. And gene regulation — the selective turning on of some genes and 
turning off of others — is a crucial problem in modern biomedical 
science. 
It is the key to the normal development of a fertilized egg into a 
human being, and also to the abnormal development of a cancer (a 
line of cells that have escaped from normal growth regulation). Other 
uses of recombinants, of more immediate medical and industrial im- 
portance, will include the manufacture of innumerable useful human 
products, such as insulin, other hormones, antibodies and antiviral 
agents. With such benefits in sight we will be paying an extravagant 
price if we perpetuate restrictions that are not justified by the hazards. 
Moreover, if this price involved only money, like the tens of millions 
of dollars wasted on lunar quarantine, it would be bad enough. But it 
also involves a greater, hidden cost : hindrance of research on diseases 
that are meanwhile taking human lives. 
A DIFFERENT SCIEXCE 
Third, though the development of these novel recombinant orga- 
nisms was created by specialists in molecular biology, the assessment 
of the possible hazard is a problem in quite a different, area of science : 
infectious disease. Unfortunately, few professionals in this field were 
included in the early discussions, though they might have kept the 
scenarios within realistic bounds. The NIH finally assembled a world- 
*Dr. Davis is Adele Lehman, professor of bacterial physiology at Harvard Medical 
School. 
[Appendix B — 316] 
