- 3 - 
leading scientists in articles filed in the case below, and again, perhaps 
the most succinct comment on this point is that from the same editorial 
in the New England Journal of Medicine: 
"That the NIH is providing millions of dollars for 
construction of containment facilities for some of this 3 
research is to its credit. Yet the 'Fort Detrick Experience' 
and the records of the Center for Disease Control make it 
painfully clear that absolute containment of micro- 
organisms is impossible — even in laboratories where 
workers are exceedingly well trained and experienced 
in working with pathogenic organisms. Human frailty 
will guarantee mistakes. What, then, can be expected 
from numerous new laboratories recently involved in 
recombinant DNA research whose personnel have at best 
had a three-day course on containment procedures? 
Here, we have the potential for a unique form of pollution, 
biologic pollution, and it will be distinguished by its 
irreversibility. In contrast to nuclear-power plants, 
which can be closed down, micro-organisms will 
reproduce and perpetuate themselves. They cannot 
be recalled. Unlike the defined pathogens studied 
at Fort Detrick, their escape cannot be monitored 
for." N.E.J.M. May 26, 1977 
Wedum AG: The Detrick Experience as a guide to 
the probable efficacy of P4 microbiological containment 
facilities for studies on microbial recombinant DNA 
molecules. Recombinant DNA Research (DHEW 
Publication No. [NIH] 76-1138). Vol. 1. Washington, 
D.C., Government Printing Office, 1976 
4. Subsequent to the filing of the action below, Appellees 
stipulated that the Risk Assessment Studies would not go forward 
[Appendix C — 17] 
