- 11 - 
17. While plaintiff recognizes the extraordinary nature 
of the relief sought, he contends that he has in this action 
under NEPA, a "special claim to judicial protection". 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus , 439 Fed. 2d. 584, 
598 (D.C. Circuit 1971). 
18. Finally, plaintiff would call to the attention of 
this Court, the opinion of our Court of Appeals in Jones v. 
District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency , 499 Fed. 2d. 
502, 512 (D.C. Circuit 1974), where the Court stated: 
"The harm against which NEPA's 
impact statement requirement was 
directed was not solely or even 
primarily adverse consequences 
to the environment; such con- 
sequences may ensue despite the 
fullest compliance. Rather 
NEPA was intended to ensure that 
decisions about federal actions 
would be made only after res- 
ponsible decision-makers had 
fully adverted to the environ- 
mental consequences of the 
actions and had decided that 
the public benefits flowing 
from the actions outweighed 
their environmental costs. 
Thus the harm with which courts 
must be concerned in NEPA cases 
is not strictly speaking, harm 
to the environment, but rather 
the failure of decision-makers 
to take environmental factors 
into account in the way that 
NEPA mandates. And for the 
purposes of deciding whether 
equitable relief is appropriate, 
we think that this harm matures 
simultaneously with NEPA's 
requirements, i. e., at the time 
the agency is, under NEPA obliged 
to file the impact statement and 
fails to do so. 
[Appendix C — 55] 
