- 2 - 
Significantly , mere speculation such as that 
contained in plaintiff's affidavits is legally insuffi- 
cient to support the extraordinary remedy of preliminary 
injunctive relief. The heavy burden of proof required 
has recently been summarized as follows : 
Injunctive relief is appropriate only 
"to prevent existing or presently 
threatened injuries" and "will not 
be granted against something merely 
feared as liable to occur at some 
indefinite time in the future." 
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 
U.S. 660, 674 (1930) . See also . 
General Fireproofing Company v. 
Wyman , 444 F. 2d 3917 393 (2d Cir. 
1971) . Injunctions will not bfe 
granted where the injuries com- 
plained of are prospective and 
"which may, indeed, never occur." 
Crimmins v. American Stock Exchange, 
Inc. , 346 F.Supp. 1256, 1262 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1972). The injury complained 
of must be of such imminence that there 
is a "clear and present" need for equit- 
able relief to prevent irreparable harm. 
Hershey Creamery Co. v. Hershey Chocolate 
Corp . ,269 F.Supp. 45 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); 
see also Assn, of Professional Engineering 
Personnel v. Radio Corp. of America, 183 
F.Supp. 834 (D.C.N.J. 1960). 
Ashland Oil, Inc, v. F.T.C. , 409 F.Supp. 297, 307 (D. D.C. 
1976) (emphasis in original) . See also , Chacon v. Granata, 
515 F. 2d. 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1975), cert , denied , 423 U.S. 
930 (1976) ("injunction is appropriate only if the anticipated 
injury is imminent and irreparable"). 
Thus, it takes more than speculation to support 
preliminary injunctive relief. In Capobianco v. First National 
Bank , 372 F.Supp. 416, 420 (M.D. Pa. 1974), Judge Muir held 
that the fear of possible adverse business decisions to be 
made in the future "is too speculative for judicial intervention 
on a preliminary injunction." As the court recognized, "fear 
[Appendix C — 222] 
