-3- 
of harm lurking only theoretically in the future does not 
justify the drastic imposition of a preliminary injunction. 
[Citation omitted]." 372 F.Supp. at. 420. 
Although plaintiff's alleged harms speculated 
to flow from recombinant DNA research are admittedly diff rent 
than the kinds of harm involved in the above cases, the 
legal principle is the same. Weighed against plaintiff'; 
mere speculation that the rigid physical and biological 
containment features of the NIH Guidelines might somehtw 
fail is the considered judgment of the experts at NIH 
and of the vast majority of the scientific community .hat 
the experiment poses no risk whatsoever. In sum, pl.intiff's 
evidence shows no factors not fully considered in tie NIH 
Guidelines and environmental impact statement. 
Thus, plaintiff's affidavits are not bas d -on any 
real evidence in the record and are entitled to lr'ttle weight. 
In a different context the court of appeals has recently 
recognized that speculation is not enough to support a cause 
of action. The court recently affirmed Judge P.att's decision 
that "opinion based solely on speculation and }ypotheses and 
[that] is unsubstantiated by any evidence in tne record, 
should be accorded little weight and cannot b-ock a summary 
judgment. Merit Motors, Inc, v. Chrysler Co;p> . , 417 F.Supp. 
263, 272 (D. D.C. 1976) ,. aff ' d, F.2d_ , U.S.App.D.C. 
(No. 76-1917, December 20, 1977), si. op. at 12. 
Plaintiff's affidavits here are similarly pecula ive and are 
insufficient to support a preliminary injmction. 
[Appendix C — 223] 
