58 
really is something to be concerned about, whereas work in a P2 laboratory 
does not convey that same sense. What I am suggesting is that a move from 
P3 to P2 can have a psychological effect on the care with which the workers 
carry out what they are doing. I think both of those should also be consid- 
ered, as well as just the simple numerical calculation of individual risk. 
DR. BARKLEY: I would just say building very sophisticated facilities 
to try to increase awareness may be a very expensive way of going about 
increasing awareness, and I think a P2 laboratory, where studies are con- 
fined to a safety cabinet, provides more specific awareness than a bench- 
top operation in a P4 facility. But I will support your point that without 
the commitment and the competence of the laboratory worker, physical con- 
tainment by itself will not accomplish those objectives. 
DR. FREDRICKSON: Dr. DeRoos . 
DR. DE ROOS : In regard to the interchangeability question, I think 
with the increased options for the laboratories that we increase also the 
difficulty with implementation through the whole process of carrying out 
and through review committees, institutional biohazard committees, because 
they have more options to deal with. 
DR. FREDRICKSON: Dr. DeRoos, please speak up a bit louder. I want to 
be sure that everyone hears you. 
DR. DE ROOS: What I am wondering about, I guess I hadn't appreciated 
the background behind the options, and I would encourage, as a comment, 
that that kind of background be included as an appendix to the Guidelines, 
because I feel that that would be very useful for biohazards committees as 
they make decisions regarding the options that are available to them. 
DR. FREDRICKSON: Dr. Ahmed. 
DR. AHMED: I want to ask a question about the couple of slides that 
you put on earlier. You mentioned earlier that there was a desire to develop 
a harmonization of guidelines between various countries, and you showed the 
matrices on containment. I got the impression that the United Kingdom's 
system of containment is slightly more stringent than the U.S. Would you 
say that, or is that a wrong conclusion? 
DR. BARKLEY: You cannot draw that conclusion by looking at their phys- 
ical containment descriptions. While the matrices did show that their level 
3 was more stringent than the NIH P3 , that makes only one point. One has to 
look at the experiments then that are assigned to their level 3 in trying to 
make some comparison. 
DR. AHMED: I see. 
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