80 
Sciences , very similar to a news article in Science a month earlier, discus- 
sing the apparent cloning of the insulin gene in a not-cert ified vector, and 
then later in another. The reporter states, "The earlier experiment clearly 
presented no threat to public health, since it was conducted in a P3 labora- 
tory as required and the vector in question has since been certified." That 
is a very curious statement. The day before it was certified there was a 
danger to public health, but the day it was certified it ceased being a dan- 
ger to public health. This is confusing, as I say, reality with our guesses 
about reality. 
Now, no error in logic as egregious as that has appeared as far as I 
can see in this version of the Guidelines, but I would call attention to a 
statement on page 49597 toward the bottom of the middle column that says, 
"Special laboratory design is used primarily in facilities in which experi- 
ments of moderate- to high-potential hazards are performed." Now, we all 
know what is meant here, but this is presumed high- or moderate-potential 
hazards, not definite or demonstrated hazards. This is not at all analogous 
to, say, the hazards of dealing with radioactive substances, where there 
is a large body of information to assess and quantitate. 
Similarly, if I can just save time by anticipating a similar thing in a 
later section, on page 49604 it is stated that, "The investigators are re- 
sponsible for determining the real and potential biohazards in the research." 
I would suggest that again it is difficult for me to see how anybody can 
define the real biohazards, since nothing has yet been demonstrated. 
DR. FREDRICKSON: Thank you, Dr. Davis. Will you remain just one mo- 
ment? Are there any questions or comments? Very well, thank you again. 
That concludes the discussion, at least for this portion of physical 
containment, and we will move on at this time to the matter of biological 
containment, and the next witness. The presenter of that will be Dr. Susan 
Gottesman from the Recombinant Advisory Committee. Dr. Gottesman? 
DR. GOTTESMAN: I am going to be reviewing the section of the revised 
Guidelines which deals with biological containment, and this section of the 
proposed revised Guidelines is somewhat expanded from that in the original 
Guidelines, and includes some material that was scattered in other parts. 
Biological containment is, of course, the use of particular hosts and 
vectors which help to minimize the spread of organisms containing recombi- 
nant DNA outside the laboratory, and in discussing biological containment, 
there are two basic principles which we try to deal with. One is to limit 
the potential for survival, of the host which contains the recombinant DNA, 
outside the laboratory. I guess the best example that has been developed 
of this is Chi-1776, the host developed by Roy Curtiss, which is now used 
in much recombinant DNA research, which has a whole set of mutations to 
make it less able to live except in a very permissive set of laboratory 
conditions . 
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