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Similar proposals for diversifying the membership of institutional bio- 
hazards committees have recently been advanced by the British Genetic Manipu- 
lation Advisory Group, often called GMAG; by the Cambridge, Massachusetts 
Experimentation Review Board; and by several bills currently under consider- 
ation in the United States Congress. The British GMAG, for example, has sug- 
gested that local genetic manipulation safety committees should include the 
biological safety officer, the supervisory medical officer, representatives of 
research workers, technicians, ancillary staff, students, or visiting workers, 
and a member of another department or laboratory. 
Second, the role of the biological safety officer. Again in Part IV B 
on the roles and responsibilities of the institution, page 49604, each insti- 
tution in which research at a P3 or P4 physical containment level is being 
conducted is required to designate a biological safety officer. The duties 
of such a biological safety officer would be roughly analogous to those of 
radiation safety officers. The language of this proposed requirement was 
carefully chosen by the Recombinant Advisory Committee. The hiring of a 
full-time biological safety officer is not required. In fact, a faculty or 
staff member already present at the institution may be designated as the 
biological safety officer. 
The Recombinant Advisory Committee's concern is that in each institu- 
tion at which high containment research is conducted, a specific person 
should be identified who is administratively responsible for the implemen- 
tation of institutional policies and institutional biohazards committee 
decisions. This new requirement will, in the view of the Recombinant 
Advisory Committee, enhance the effectiveness of institutional biohazards 
committees by providing for ongoing oversight between the episodic meetings 
of the local committee. A growing number of American universities and 
laboratories have, on their own initiative, already designated or appointed a 
biological safety officer. The British Williams Report of August, 1976, and 
current British practice in the monitoring of recombinant DNA research, also 
accord a central role to the biological safety officer. 
Correspondents commenting on the proposed revised Guidelines were 
divided in their opinions concerning the biological safety officer require- 
ment. One view was that local institutions should be allowed to work out 
their own administrative arrangements. Another view was that a biohazards 
control safety manager should be appointed in addition to the biological 
safety officer. The Recombinant Advisory Committee has sought to allow great 
flexibility in the fulfillment of this new requirement, but believes that the 
requirement itself will assist in assuring compliance with the Guidelines. 
Third, the certification procedure. The 1976 Guidelines assigned re- 
sponsibility for certifying EK2 and EK3 host-vector systems to the Recom- 
binant Advisory Committee. In practice, however, since the first EK2 systems 
were certified in 1976, a two-step certification procedure has been followed. 
First, after review by an expert subcommittee, the Recombinant Advisory Com- 
mittee recommends acceptable candidate systems to the Director of NIH for 
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