286 
Finally, I must say that we have heard a great deal about the fear of 
epidemics that haven't materialized. I wouldn't go so far as to say that 
we have crystallized an attitudinal epidemic, but we have certainly produced 
a pervasive attitudinal change as far as the public is concerned, of which 
this is not the only factor. There are many factors that brought this about. 
But I think that no matter how passionately a Jim Watson can speak, it isn't 
enough for a few scientists to say "I made a mistake; I apologize, I was 
wrong," to turn off that pervasive attitudinal change. 
I think it bespeaks highly the investment of time, Mr. Chairman, which 
you and your colleagues have brought to this task, that you are willing to 
live with it, to see it through seriously and, in spite of our part-time 
warriors' advice we give you, to deal with it on a continuing basis. 
DR. FREDRICKSON: Thank you, Professor Rosenblith. 
Dr. Roger DeRoos , Head of the Department of Environmental Health and 
Safety at the University of Minnesota. 
DR. DE ROOS : I might comment briefly to begin with on a perspective 
that I come from. I sort of see myself and the Department in between the 
Guidelines and the investigator in a sense, trying to do some of those 
things that it says for the biosafety officer to assure. At the same time, 
I guess I would identify a great deal with what Mr. Beaty and Ms. Menard 
have said earlier; and I think that my comments will be directed primarily 
toward the idea that, both from what the public witnesses have said and 
from what others have said, the integrity of the institutional biohazard 
committee is somewhat of a keystone to both the public's understanding that 
the research is being carried out safely — indeed, if and when it is — and 
within the inner institution . . . understandings of that. 
I think, for example, that the section on containment is-- I really 
heartily endorse the way that has been revised to make it more easily inter- 
preted by the biohazard committee. I think in making that revision, however, 
that by introducing the tabular alternatives of containment for the same 
experiment, we have introduced an area of judgment, a great deal more judg- 
ment. I think Dr. Rosenblith made that point a couple of times in the 
meet ing . 
I believe that one of the things that could help make those judgments 
would be an additional appendix, if you will, and I will comment on that fur- 
ther as I go along in relation to also the institutional kinds of concerns. 
Some of the discussion that Dr. Barkley brought out earlier about making 
those judgments, if that can be included: not necessarily making the Guide- 
lines more specific, but I think that biohazard committees, knowing the 
basis on which those judgments are made, would indeed apply those judgments, 
and it would bring a degree of uniformity among biohazards committees across 
the country. 
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