APRIL 27-28-MINirrES OF MEETING 
19 
12 to 1. The RAC specified that the approval for reduction in 
containment was restricted to the clones specifically cited in 
the MUA. 
J. A request by Dr. Robert Goldberger to propagate a plasnid 
containing cDNA made from vitellogenin mRNA was approved at 
P3 + EKl (Dr. Gottesman abstaining) provided that the vector 
pBR322 was used. The mRNA had been characterized by hybridization, 
gel electrophoresis, and translation in a cell- free system. 
K. A request by Dr. Robert J. Crouch to lower containment for a 
we 11- characterized clone containing mouse ribosomal ENA to 
P2 + EKl was approved. The DNA had been characterized by 
hybridization and restriction enzyme analysis. 
VI. REMARKS OF THE CHAIRMAN 
Dr. Stetten addressed the Qommittee regarding his decision to resign 
as its chairman. His remarks are reproduced in Attachment VII. 
VII. VIRUS WORKING GROUP REPORT 
The Virus Report was presented by Dr. Harry Ginsberg. Dr. Ginsberg 
described the events leading to the U.S. - EMBQ Workshop to Assess 
Risks for Recombinant DNA Experiments Involving the Genomes of Animal , 
Plant , and Insect Viruses . He noted that discussion at the meeting 
of the NIH Director's Advisory Committee in December 1977 centered 
about the restrictions imposed by the revised Guidelines upon recom- 
binant DNA research when viruses are used. As a result of the 
discussion, NIH sponsored the virus workshop at Ascot, England, in 
January 1978. The participants came from a variety of disciplines 
and included molecular biologists, virologists, epidemiologists and 
experts in infectious disease. Most were not involved in recombinant 
DNA research. The charge to this group was to assess the possibility 
of hazard arising from the cloning of viral ENA and from the use of 
viral DNA as a vector. They were to consider the hazard to laboratory 
workers and to the population at large. 
The workshop considered the entire range of eukaryotic viruses, 
including insect and plant pathogenic viruses. No situation was 
envisioned in which a recombinant virus or variant would become a 
greater hazard than the virus itself. In a number of instances, 
the group believed that the host range would be altered but that, 
there would be no increase in pathogenic potential. The report 
represents the unanimous opinion of the participants at the Workshop. 
Subsequent to the U.S. - EMBO Workshop, a Working Group was convened 
to review the findings and translate them into reccmmendations for 
changes in the experimental section of the Guidelines. Their 
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