receives any support for recombinant DNA research from 
the NIH." 
He said this would go beyond the working group's limitation to 
testing in humans or deliberate release into the environment, but 
he said it had the advantage of simplifying matters and applying 
the same rules to foreign research as are applied to domestic 
research. 
Dr. McGarrity asked for clarification of the phrase "direct 
extension" in Mr. Lanman's first suggestion. He asked if this 
was meant to apply to domestic work in which an investigator 
turned his research over to a commercial company for development. 
Mr. Lanman replied he envisioned this only applying to work done 
abroad. 
Dr. McGarrity then asked how his second suggested change would 
deal with the host country which has established rules. Mr. 
Lanman said his suggested wording only applied to the first 
sentence and that he would retain the remainder of the wording 
from the working group's recommendation. 
Dr. McGarrity asked if organizations and institutions such as the 
American Type Culture Collection and his own institution, the 
Coriell Institute for Medical Research, which are repositories 
for biological materials and receive NIH funding, would be held 
responsible for eventual uses of materials which they have 
supplied. Investigators might then use them in an experiment 
which those organizations took no more part in than to supply the 
original cell culture, virus, bacterium, or plasmid. He 
questioned whether this was really enforceable. 
Dr. Johnson said there was another issue that the language didn't 
address and that was putting the original NIH grantee in a 
position of, "trying to guarantee all future downstream 
research." He said the grantees probably could not guarantee 
that and as such this could lead to an unwillingness to share 
materials for research with others unless some guarantee could be 
given to them that they would not be penalized. Additionally, he 
said researchers in other countries should be free to improve on 
research materials developed in this country and should be able 
to look for better applications to human, animal or other types 
of problems using them in any way that they see fit. 
Furthermore, the proposed wording of Section I-C was also putting 
foreign governments in a position of having to accept the NIH 
Guidelines or develop their own, and this may be unenforceable. 
Dr . Atlas agreed and said the only way an investigator could then 
protect himself would be to not share biological materials with 
his colleagues. 
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