BL1-P containment is little different from a release (windows and vents need 
not have screens, runoff can flow freely into the ground); only organisms 
that will not survive or be disseminated should be tested under these 
conditions . 
45. BL3-P (or BL2-P + biological containment) should also be recommended for 
infectious agents with a potential for serious detrimental impact that are not 
defined "exotic" (FR section 50) . It does not matter where an agent is from, 
if it causes damage. BL3-P containment should be considered for pathogens 
from a different geographic area, even if the area is within the continental 
United States (i.e. the pathogen is from the west coast and being studied on 
the east coast). In addition, BL3-P containment should be used for non-exotic 
agents that are genetically engineered so as to alter host-range or virulence. 
In fact, native pathogens altered in this way may have a greater potential for 
damage than exotic ones, since hosts for altered native pathogens are more 
likely to be nearby. 
48a. If microorganisms with potent vertebrate toxins are believed to readily 
survive and disperse, BL4-P containment should be recommended. 
58. Because, as noted in the above comments on section 4, BLl-P containment is 
little different from a release, this level is generally only appropriate for 
genetically- altered non-weedy plants that will not flower during an experiment 
or otherwise have no capability for sexual transfer. Since greenhouse studies 
will typically constitute the initial testing of an engineered organisms, 
"containment" that is essentially a release is not appropriate for 
microorganisms. In particular, the restriction that microbes have "no 
recognized potential... for serious detrimental impact," is not sufficient. 
(Is moderate detrimental impact allowable?) 
90, 98, 113a, 138. Contingency plans should be reviewed by the IBC prior to 
the experiment. 
100. Decontamination of run-off should be recommended for work with 
microorganisms. Runoff from initial experiments could be monitored, and if 
plate counts or equivalent measures show minimal survival, decomtamination 
could be ceased. 
106b. Pollen barriers should be required for wind pollinated plants that will 
flower during the course of a study. 
128. 154. Add to end of sentence, "...and that benchtops and work surfaces 
should be decontaminated daily." Such cleaning is routine in microbiology 
laboratories . 
157. Chemicals may not work against a target spore forming microorganism in 
the same way as an indicator microorganism. We recommend that chemical 
efficacy tests for spore formers be done with the target microbe. 
170. Injections should not constitute containment if the injected 
microorganism is transmissable by sucking arthropods. This is especially 
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Recombinant DNA Research, Volume 13 
